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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 restore	 the	 situation	 of	 business	 negotiation	 in	 a	 quasi	framed	 field	 experiment.	We	 recruit	 undergraduate	 and	master	 students	 as	 our	subjects,	and	conduct	43	sessions	of	negotiation	experiment.	The	regression	result	demonstrates	 that	 the	 value	 of	 conservation	 is	 positively	 associated	 with	 bribe	acceptance,	 while	 the	 value	 of	 self-transcendence	 exerts	 negative	 influences	 on	bribe	 acceptance.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 values	 of	 openness	 to	 change	 and	self-enhancement	do	not	 show	any	stable	and	significant	 results.	 In	addition,	 the	result	 also	 indicates	 the	 existence	 of	 fairness	 and	 reciprocity,	 and	 a	 concave	relationship	 between	 bribe	 amount	 and	 contract	 price	 augment	 despite	 its	immaturity.	 	
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 Introduction	A.
Corruption	has	been	a	trending	issue	for	a	long	time,	of	which	many	politicians	and	academics	have	been	devoted	to	investigating	the	true	determinants	and	possible	solutions.	 As	 corruption	 is	 defined	 as	 abuse	 of	 official	 power	 for	 private	 gain,	 it	inevitably	occurs	when	there	is	a	division	between	cash	flow	rights	and	property	control	 rights	 (Kaufmann	 &	 Siegelbaum,	 1997).	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 division	stimulates	 the	business	owner,	who	appreciates	 the	 cash	 flow	rights	of	 a	 certain	property,	 to	 bribe	 the	 property	 owner,	 who	 has	 the	 control	 the	 usage	 of	 this	property.	 Nevertheless,	 while	 widely	 admitted	 that	 corruption	 has	 an	 adverse	effect	 on	 overall	 long-term	 economic	 development,	 one	 cannot	 argue	 that	 the	influences	of	corruption	or	bribery	are	purely	negative.	For	example,	bribery	may	exert	 adverse	 influences	 on	 the	 third	 party’s	 interests,	 resulting	 in	 inefficient	outcomes;	 contrarily	 it	 also	 serves	 as	 an	 accelerator	 in	 strengthening	 corporate	relationship	and	 social	 ties.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 figure	out	 the	back-stage	process	 and	 investigate	 the	 factors	 determining	 the	 occurrence	 of	 unethical	behaviours.	 	
The	 current	 literature	 explores	 this	 bribery	 mechanism	 mainly	 through	 three	approaches,	while	 each	of	 them	retains	 its	 own	 limitation	 respectively.	 First,	 the	theoretical	 studies	 frame	 bribery	 situation	 in	 a	 game,	 so	 that	 predictions	 of	equilibriums	can	be	generated.	However,	 it	 requires	unrealizable	assumptions	of	rationality	 and	 perfect	 information.	 Second,	 the	 conventional	 lab	 experimental	method	 overcomes	 the	 limitation	 of	 rational	 assumption,	 while	 it	 observes	participants’	 behaviours	 in	 a	 corrupt	 scenario	 and	 in	 an	 artificial	 context.	 As	 a	result,	 the	 representativeness	 of	 the	 experiment	 may	 be	 questioned.	 The	 third	approach	 is	 empirical	 research,	 which	 tries	 to	 depict	 the	 factors	 related	 to	corruptive	behaviours,	using	real-world	cases.	Although	the	limitations	of	last	two	approaches	can	be	overcome,	few	companies	are	willing	to	disclose	information	of	unethicality,	 resulting	 in	 little	 available	 data.	 Based	 on	 these	 three	 research	
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approaches,	 the	 determinants	 of	 bribery	 engagement	 can	 be	 categorized	 in	 two	aspects:	 the	 external	 institutional	 environment	 (e.g.	 externality	 effects,	 scrutiny	system,	 punishment	 scheme	 and	 accountability	 mechanism),	 and	 individual	characteristics	(e.g.	age,	gender,	education	backgrounds,	wages	and	human	values	and	beliefs).	For	 this	 thesis,	human	values	and	beliefs	are	of	particular	 interests,	since	 the	 current	 research	on	 this	 aspect	 is	not	 comprehensive	 and	 complete.	 In	addition,	 these	 elements	 are	what	 organizations	 and	people	 can	 influence;	while	for	institutional	improvements,	it	stipulates	the	efforts	of	governments	at	country	or	even	universal	levels.	 	
Therefore,	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 mitigating	 the	 limitations	 of	 three	 research	approaches	as	aforementioned	and	by	the	inspirations	from	the	literatures	related	to	human	values,	 this	master	 thesis	attempts	 to	 restore	 the	situation	of	business	negotiation	 in	 an	 analogous	 framed	 field	 experiment,	 and	 thereby	 captures	 the	relationship	between	the	human	values	and	the	bribe	acceptance	(stage	1)	as	well	as	 the	 bribe	 amount	 and	 the	 ultimate	 contract	 price	 (stage	 2).	 Despite	 that	 our	experimental	subjects	are	students,	 the	game	is	designed	so	that	 the	participants	are	unaware	of	 being	part	 of	 a	 bribery-related	 experiment.	 The	participants	will	then	decide	whether	to	accept	the	bribe,	and	then	the	price	concession	in	exchange	for	the	bribe	in	a	neutrally	framed	context.	Thus,	it	can	to	some	extent	enhance	the	external	validity	of	experimental	approach.	Concerning	stage	1,	we	find	that	values	of	conservation	and	self-transcendence	will	exert	significant	influences	on	bribery	acceptance.	As	for	stage	2,	the	result	is	still	very	preliminary,	but	indicates	that	the	price	compromise	an	individual	would	like	to	make	for	an	additional	unit	of	bribe	is	of	diminishing	margin.	 	 	
The	content	of	the	thesis	will	be	developed	as	follow.	First,	a	Literature	Review	of	current	 research	 on	 bribe	 and	 business	 negotiation	will	 be	 provided.	 It	 tends	 to	identify	the	research	gap	and	inspirations	for	the	design	of	the	experiment.	Then,	we	 will	 illustrate	 the	 details	 of	 experimental	 design,	 treatment	 and	 main	
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hypothesis	 in	 the	 section	 of	 Experimental	 Methodology.	 It	 is	 followed	 by	 the	descriptive	 and	 econometric	 analysis	 of	 our	 samples,	 as	 in	Data	Description	 and	
Estimation	 Results.	 Subsequently,	 the	 section	 of	 Limitations	 and	 Reflections	 will	demonstrate	 some	 restrictions	 of	 this	 thesis	 and	 potential	 improvements	 in	 the	future.	 Finally,	 Conclusion	 will	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 thesis,	 and	 some	implications	of	its	results.	 	
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 Literature	Review	B.
Despite	no	same	bribery	experiment	of	business	negotiation	conducted	previously,	there	 exists	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 empirical	 research	 of	 real-world	 case	 studies,	surveys,	 and	 experimental	 work,	 combined	 with	 support	 of	 theoretical	 models,	capturing	 the	 factors	 related	 to	 bribery	 behaviours	 and	 its	 influences	 on	 price	bargaining	results.	Regarding	these	different	types	of	models	and	approaches,	this	section	 is	going	 to	provide	an	overall	 review	on	 three	main	areas	 (see	Figure	1),	including	(B.1)	theoretical	studies,	(B.2)	experimental	studies,	and	(B.3)	empirical	studies,	which	also	serves	as	the	primary	basis	for	this	master	thesis.	
B.1	 	 Theoretical	Studies	
The	theoretical	studies	deploy	game-theoretic	model,	based	on	which	researchers	discuss	 individuals’	bribery	behaviours	and	 thereby	provide	possible	predictions	on	outcome	equilibriums.	A	game	 is	designed	or	presented,	where	 there	 is	more	
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than	one	decision-maker	and	each	of	them	can	affect	the	outcome.	There	are	two	fundamental	 assumptions:	 (1)	 all	 decision-makers	 are	 rational,	 resulting	 in	 the	choice	maximizing	his	or	her	utilities;	(2)	their	belief	on	other	players	are	correct,	or	it	can	be	deduced	through	long	time	interactions	from	the	past.	Based	on	these	assumptions,	each	play	will	calculate	each	benefits	and	costs	of	each	action,	while	predicting	others’	reactions	to	his	action,	in	order	to	optimize	his	action	provided	all	 other	 player	 are	 doing	 the	 same.	 It	 allows	 us	 to	 find	 mathematically	 the	outcome	or	equilibriums	of	 the	game,	where	no	one	has	 the	 incentive	 to	deviate	unilaterally.	 	
When	 employing	 game-theoretic	 model	 to	 frame	 real-world	 cases,	 two	 types	 of	games,	 namely	 sequential	 and	 simultaneous	 game,	 are	 most	 widely	 used	 by	researchers.	With	regard	to	the	sequential	game,	parties	of	business	negotiations	move	 in	 different	 sequence,	 and	 thus	 tree	 diagram	 is	 used	 to	 present	 such	extensive	game.	In	addition,	the	later	party	has	some	knowledge	about	the	earlier	actions,	 although	 it	 need	 not	 be	 perfect	 information	 and	 might	 be	 very	 little	knowledge	 of	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 earlier	 parties,	 such	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 the	particular	action.	When	the	previous	party	knows	that,	he	or	she	will	predict	what	the	later	party	will	choose	regarding	each	of	his	or	her	action,	and	then	optimizing	the	 payoff	 among	 these	 actions.	 Therefore,	 backward-induction	 is	 commonly	deployed	to	find	the	equilibrium	of	the	price	without	and	with	bribing.	 	
For	 example,	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 the	 relationship	 between	 firm’s	 bribery	 and	bureaucratic	 harassment,	 Kaufmann	 and	 Wei	 (1999)	 use	 a	 simple	 Stackelberg	game.	 The	 corruptible	 government	 official	 moves	 first	 to	 select	 the	 level	 of	
harassment	 (H),	which	can	be	 tax	assessment,	 fire	safety	requirement	or	delayed	license	release,	in	the	aim	to	maximize	his	payoff	(i.e.	the	bribe	(B)	received	from	the	 firm).	 Then,	 the	 firm	 chooses	 the	 bribe	 amount	 (B).	 The	 effects	 of	 bribe	 on	reducing	 real	 harassment	 and	 thus	 improving	 firm’s	 profit	 can	 be	 shown	 in	 the	equation	of	firm’s	payoff.	To	maximize	its	payoff,	the	relationship	between	B	and	H	
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can	 be	 deduced,	 through	 simple	 first	 derivative	 and	 total	 differentiation.	Specifically,	 the	 firm	 tends	 to	bribe	more	 if	 faced	harassment	 is	higher.	Knowing	that,	the	optimal	choice	for	government	official	is	to	impose	highest	harassment	up	to	 the	 firm’s	 tolerance.	 Obviously,	 the	 results	 contradict	 the	 “efficient	 grease”	theory,	and	conclude	a	higher	costs	and	lower	capital	value	resulting	from	bribing.	 	
Apart	 from	 that,	 simultaneous	 games,	 where	 some	 players	 will	 move	simultaneously,	are	more	representative	in	the	context	of	business	negotiation.	For	example,	 sealed-auction	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 recognized	 one.	 The	 procurement	person	serves	like	an	auctioneer,	and	will	collect	the	bids	from	sales	persons	from	different	 companies,	 and	 then	 submit	 to	 his	 or	 her	 company	 (i.e.	 the	 buyer).	 In	Burguet	and	Perry’s	(2007)	research,	the	influences	of	bribery	in	a	sealed	auction	occur	in	two	types:	first,	the	auctioneer	(procurement	person)	may	allow	the	sales	person	 with	 lowest	 person	 to	 receive	 a	 price	 equal	 to	 the	 second	 lowest	 price;	second,	who	gives	the	bribery	may	obtain	the	right	of	first	refusal,	which	gives	him	an	 additional	 opportunity	 to	 resubmit	 his	 bid	 after	 knowing	 others’	 bids.	 In	addition,	Buchner	et	al.	(2008)	try	to	capture	the	relationship	between	bribery	and	contract	 price	 through	 the	 game	where	 sales	persons	 compete	both	on	bids	 and	bribes.	 Furthermore,	 based	on	 these	 types	of	 bribery,	 Cai,	Henderson	and	Zhang	(2013)	propose	a	special	effect	of	bribery	especially	in	two-stage	auction,	where	a	few	bidders	are	selected	to	enter	a	second	round	of	bidding.	Without	corruption,	this	 type	of	auction	would	 induce	higher	sales	price	 for	properties	 that	have	 few	bidders,	resulting	in	a	negative	selection	on	properties’	unobservable.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 existence	 of	 bribery	 will	 instead	 exert	 positive	 selection	 effect,	 since	auction	of	hotter	properties	are	converted	into	more	corruptible	auctions.	 	 	 	 	 	
In	 these	 auction-type	 business	 negotiations,	 the	 role	 of	 procurement	 persons	 is	limited	to	information	distortion,	while	in	reality	and	in	the	case	large	companies,	the	manager	may	not	have	enough	time	to	check	all	the	submitted	bids,	and	then	negotiate	with	chosen	seller.	Instead,	there	would	be	larger	space	for	procurement	
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person	 to	 negotiate	 the	 contract.	 Therefore,	 more	 complicated	 game-theoretic	models	 are	 established	 then	 to	 capture	 the	 bargaining	 situation	 where	 parties	interact	 with	 each	 other.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Nash	 bargaining	model	 (Nash,	 1950;	Kalai	&	Smordinsky,	1975)	formulates	the	Nash	Bargaining	Product	(equation	1),	by	maximizing	which	the	bargaining	equilibrium	can	be	found.	 	
𝑀𝑎𝑥!(Φ(𝜃)) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥!((Π! − 𝐷!)!(Π! − 𝐷!)!!!)                        (1)	
where	 p	 and	 s	 represents	 the	 two	 parties	 in	 the	 game;	 𝜃	 is	 the	 variable	 two	parties	argue	on;	 Π!	 and	 Π!	 are	payoff	for	two	parties	respectively,	if	they	agree	to	cooperate	during	the	negotiation;	 𝐷!	 and	 𝐷!	 are	the	threat	points,	which	are	the	 disagreement	 outcomes	 if	 the	 negotiation	 breaks;	 𝛼 	 and	 1− 𝛼 	 are	 the	respective	bargaining	power	for	two	parties,	and	0<𝛼<1.	
This	bargaining	model	has	been	widely	adopted	by	many	researchers	in	exploring	bribery	 context.	 For	 example,	 to	 alleviate	 the	 criminal	 commitment	 in	 a	bribery-possible	 context	 where	 the	 criminal	 and	 the	 arresting	 official	 may	cooperate	with	each	other,	Bowles	and	Garoupa	(1997)	explore	 the	 influences	of	deterrence	 of	 criminal	 sanction.	 Through	 different	 settings	 on	 fine	 tickets,	 they	combine	a	sequential	game	with	a	bargaining	process,	where	the	detected	criminal	and	 the	 official	 negotiate	 on	 the	 bribe	 amount	 (i.e.	 𝜃 	 in	 equation	 1).	 This	game-theoretic	 model	 allows	 us	 to	 figure	 out	 how	 the	 game	 will	 end	 with	 the	optimized	choices	of	both	criminal	and	arresting	police.	As	proved	by	Bowles	and	Garoupa	(1997),	the	maximal	fine	for	deterrence	purpose	(Becker,	1968)	will	not	serve	 as	 the	 optimal	 solution	 in	 reducing	 commitment	 rate	 in	 the	 presence	 of	corruption.	This	model	has	been	further	improved	by	Chang,	Lai	and	Yang	(2000)	by	 incorporating	of	additional	psychological	 costs	of	detected	corrupted	officials.	Due	 to	 snowballing	 effects	 of	 social	 norms,	 the	 intensified	 fines	 would	 exert	perverse	 impacts	on	criminal	commitment,	provided	the	status	quo	corruption	 is	already	widely	spread.	Later,	they	demonstrate	that	this	effects	of	social	norms	on	the	punishment	deterrence	also	applicable	in	a	game-theoretic	tax	evasion	model	
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(Chang	&	Lai,	2004).	 	
As	mentioned	 above,	 the	Nash	 Bargaining	Model	 should	 allow	 us	 to	 explore	 the	influences	 of	 bribery	 on	 contract	 price	 in	 the	 context	 of	 business	 negotiation.	Specifically,	the	business	negotiation	can	be	framed	as	a	game,	where	there	are	two	players,	 namely	 sales	 person	 and	 procurement	 person.	 They	will	 bargain	 on	 the	contract	 price	 of	 a	 certain	 product	 on	 behalf	 of	 their	 companies	 respectively.	Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 two	 main	 difficulties	 and	 limitations.	 First,	 in	 this	bargaining	model,	we	have	two	endogenous	variables	to	bargain.	One	is	the	bribe	amount,	and	another	 the	price	after	bribing.	However,	 in	 the	above	models,	only	changes	 of	 exogenous	 settings	 are	 involved,	 such	 as	 fines	 or	 probability	 of	detection,	and	then	explore	how	these	changes	will	influence	the	players’	optimal	choice	 in	bargaining	process.	Another	 limitation	 is	 related	 to	 the	 assumptions	of	game-theoretic	 models	 that	 all	 decision	 makers	 are	 rational	 and	 with	 perfect	information.	In	reality	and	especially	in	the	bribery	context,	they	are	not	realizable	and	the	role	of	equity,	trust	and	reciprocity	should	be	discussed.	For	example,	the	tendency	 of	 inequity	 aversion	 generally	 exists,	 when	 people	 have	 inclination	 to	avoid	both	advantageous	and	disadvantageous	inequality	(Fehr-Schmidt,	2001).	It	can	 to	 some	 extent	 explain	 the	 paradox	 of	 the	 dictator	 and	 ultimatum	 games.	Additionally,	 when	 bribe	 often	 occurs	 when	 the	 enforceable	 licit	 contracts	 are	vacant	and	both	parties	have	good	reasons	 to	remain	silent,	 it	has	 to	rely	on	 the	trust	 and	 reciprocity	 mechanism.	 As	 argued	 by	 Rabin	 (1993),	 incorporating	fairness	 and	 reciprocation	 into	 games	 is	 essential,	 when	 altruist	 people	 are	motivated	to	help	those	who	help	them	and	hurt	those	who	hurt	them.	Similarly	in	business	negotiation,	two	players	will	not	only	care	about	their	own	best	choices	based	on	pecuniary	payoffs,	but	also	considering	the	fairness	when	arguing	on	the	contract	 price.	 It	 necessitates	 the	 experimental	 economics,	 which	 provides	 an	opportunity	to	study	the	unobservable	bribery	behaviours	in	laboratory.	The	next	section	will	provide	more	detailed	overview	of	experimental	studies.	
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B.2	 	 Experimental	Studies	
Due	 to	 the	 immoral	 and	 unobservable	 nature	 of	 bribery	 activities,	 experiments	become	an	indispensable	approach	to	explore	the	situation	of	bribery	in	business	negotiation.	This	section	will	provide	an	overview	on	the	current	research	findings	related	 to	 experiments	 in	 the	 context	 of	 business	 negotiation.	 First,	 we	 need	 to	define	an	experimental	taxonomy	and	thereby	distinguish	between	laboratory	and	field	experiments.	As	proposed	by	Harrison	and	List	(2004),	one	should	determine	the	field	context	of	an	experiment	by	six	dimensions:	1. The	nature	of	the	subject	pool:	When	student	subjects	can	be	taken	as	the	standard	 subject	 pool,	 and	 “outdoor”	 participants	 are	 viewed	 as	nonstandard;	2. The	nature	of	the	information	that	the	subjects	bring	to	the	task:	In	the	filed,	the	 nonstandard	 subjects	 also	 bring	 certain	 information	 to	 their	 trading	activities,	while	in	laboratory	settings	the	importance	of	this	information	is	diminished,	by	design;	3. The	 nature	 of	 commodity:	 the	 distinctions	 between	 physical	 goods	 or	actual	 services	 and	 artificially	 defined	 goods	 could	 also	 be	 a	 factor	influencing	behaviours;	4. The	nature	of	the	task	or	trading	rules	applied:	since	one	would	expect	that	field	 experience	 could	 play	 a	 major	 role	 in	 helping	 individuals	 develop	heuristics	 for	 specific	 tasks,	 there	 exist	 differences	 between	super-experienced	and	inexperienced	subjects;	5. The	 nature	 of	 the	 stakes:	 as	 the	 stakes	 used	 in	 lab	 can	 be	 very	 different	from	 those	 encountered	 in	 reality,	 it	would	 result	 in	different	 valuations	and	thereby	behavioural	changes;	and	6. The	nature	of	the	environment	that	the	subject	operates	in:	the	environment	can	provide	a	context,	which	would	suggest	strategies	and	heuristics	while	the	lab,	usually	the	classroom,	would	induce	the	sense	of	role	playing.	 	Based	on	these	six	criteria,	Harrison	and	List	(2004)	categorize	experiments	 into	
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an	incomplete	classification	scheme:	
• A	conventional	 lab	experiment	 is	 the	one	adopts	a	standard	subject	pool,	an	abstract	framing	and	an	imposed	set	of	rules;	
• An	 artefactual	 field	 experiment	 is	 the	 same	 as	 a	 conventional	 lab	experiment	except	for	that	it	employs	a	nonstandard	subject	pool;	
• A	framed	field	experiment	 is	the	same	as	artefactual	experiment	but	with	field	 context	 in	 either	 commodity,	 task,	 or	 information	 set	 that	 the	subjects	can	use;	
• A	natural	 field	 experiment	 is	 the	 same	 as	 a	 framed	 experiment	while	 its	embraces	 an	environment	where	 the	 subjects	naturally	undertake	 these	tasks	and	where	the	subjects	are	unaware	of	being	part	of	the	experiment.	
Although	 the	 conventional	 laboratory	 experiments	 are	 faced	 with	 limitation	 of	predicting	 field	 behaviours,	 it	 is	 widely	 adopted	 by	 the	 current	 bribery-related	research.	 For	 example,	 through	 employing	 students,	 researchers	 commonly	construct	an	Ultimatum	game,	where	the	first	mover	is	briber,	and	he	decides	the	amount	he	wants	 to	 transfer	 to	 the	second	mover.	The	second	mover	represents	the	public	officer,	who	decides	whether	to	accept	or	reject	that	transfer.	If	accepted,	the	second	mover’s	account	will	 increase	by	more	of	 the	 transferred,	and	he	will	choose	 between	 two	 options	 as	 reciprocity	 for	 that	 transfer.	 If	 rejected,	 both	accounts	 remain	 the	 same.	 This	 game	 is	 designed	 such	 that	 players	 trust	 each	other,	 both	 of	 their	 payoffs	 will	 increase	 (Gachter	 &	 Falk,	 2002;	 Irlenbusch	 &	Sliwka,	 2005).	 It	 can	 to	 some	 extent	 confirm	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 reciprocity	relationship,	which	 is	 the	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	bribery	 relationship.	When	assuming	 all	 players	 are	 rational,	 this	 sequential	 game	 will	 end	 with	 no	cooperation	 and	money	 transfer.	However,	 it	 contradicts	 to	 the	 findings	 in	most	laboratory	 experiment.	 Additionally,	 in	 Abbink,	 Irlenbusch	 and	 Renner’s	 (2002)	ultimatum	game,	players	are	assigned	with	a	certain	probability,	which	simulates	the	risk	of	exposure	and	corresponded	penalties.	If	any	one	of	them	is	discovered,	his	 payoff	 will	 be	 reduced.	 As	 a	 result,	 they	 find	 that	 the	 penalty	 threat	 will	
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significantly	reduce	the	corruption.	Another	experimental	treatment	they	apply	is	negative	 externalities	on	a	 third	party,	 but	no	apparent	 influences	 are	 found.	On	the	 contrary,	Barr	 and	Serra	 (2009)	 argue	 that	 high	negative	 externalities	 on	 an	innocent	 third	party	will	 significantly	 reduce	 the	 likelihood	of	bribe	offering	and	acceptance	in	a	petty	corruption	scenario.	 	
Furthermore,	 Serra	 (2012)	 also	 explore	 bribery	 by	 reframing	 the	 experiment,	where	 the	 “government	 official”	 will	 first	 initiate	 whether	 and	 how	 much	 to	demand	from	the	“private	citizens”	in	a	corruptible	transaction,	and	the	“citizens”	will	 decide	 whether	 and	 how	 much	 to	 bribe.	 By	 introducing	 different	 external	accountability	system,	Serra	(2012)	argues	that	the	combination	of	top-down	and	bottom-up	 monitoring	 will	 significantly	 mitigate	 the	 problem	 of	 corruption,	although	the	probability	of	being	fined	is	higher	in	top-down	accountability	system.	Similar	game	is	also	used	by	Abbink	et	al.	(2012),	and	the	findings	show	that	the	benefits	of	asymmetric	liability	(i.e.	only	punish	bribees	while	leaving	bribers	free)	remain	contentious	when	taking	the	consideration	of	potential	retaliation	from	the	bribees.	On	 the	contrary,	other	 research	demonstrates	 that	 the	punishment	does	constrain	the	bribery-giving	situation	(Yu	et	al.,	2014),	while	the	amount	of	bribery	will	not	be	influenced	by	the	possibility	and	severity	of	punishment	(Serra,	2012).	Furthermore,	 in	 the	 experiment	 of	 Chuah,	 Hoffmann,	 and	 Larner	 (2014),	 it	 is	shown	that	values	of	harmony,	face	and	desire	to	win,	will	influence	participators’	choice	in	negotiation	between	bribery-involved	cooperation	and	competitive	one.	Other	 experimental	 research	 also	 results	 in	 similar	 significant	 influences	 of	personal	values	on	the	corruption	engagement	(Belle	&	Cantarelli,	2017).	
Nevertheless,	the	representativeness,	or	external	validity	of	these	lab	experiments	should	be	discussed,	when	corruption	 is	usually	perceived	as	 illicit	and	 immoral.	As	all	these	laboratory	experiments	are	conducted	when	participants	are	informed	of	the	truth	of	the	experiments,	they	are	provided	with	option	to	bribe	and	accept	the	bribery	with	giving	back	 some	 favours.	This	 is	 referred	as	 loaded	 framing	 in	
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Abbink	and	Hennig-Schmidt’s	(2006)	definition,	while	neutral	framing	refers	to	the	situation	 when	 no	 “bribe“	 –wording	 is	 explicitly	 mentioned.	 They	 assert	 that	different	 framing	 methods	 have	 no	 significant	 influence	 on	 bribery	 behaviours	with	18	independent	observations	per	treatment.	However,	more	recent	research	demonstrates	 the	 existence	 of	 framing	 effects.	 For	 instance,	 Cox	 (2015)	 states	 a	framing	difference	in	cooperation	games	of	public	goods	and	suggests	that	gender	exerts	some	influences	on	such	framing	effects.	Hafner,	Reif	and	Seebauer	(2017)	also	assert	the	framing	effects	in	the	case	of	behaviours	of	physicians	towards	their	patients,	by	comparing	neutral	and	medical	framings.	Moreover,	specifically	for	the	bribery	context,	Barr	and	Serra	(2009)	also	argue	for	the	existence	of	differences	between	 games	 framed	 in	 corruption	 scenario	 and	 in	 abstract	 terms,	 especially	when	subjects	are	bribe	offers.	They	attempt	to	explain	the	previous	insignificance	by	 distinguish	 between	 immorality	 problem	 and	 artificiality	 of	 role-playing	 in	loaded	framing.	On	the	one	hand,	by	directly	mentioning	words	of	bribery,	it	may	impel	 the	participants	 to	abstain	 from	corrupt-like	acts,	which	are	considered	as	immoral.	 For	 instance,	 Banerjee	 (2016)	 argues	 that	 the	 social	 norms	 governing	bribery	 framing	 and	 neutral	 framing	 are	 different,	 when	 the	 bribery	 framing	triggers	 additional	moral	 costs,	 resulting	 in	 reduced	 corruption	 engagement.	 On	the	 other	 hand,	 framed	 in	 a	 corruption	 scenario	 also	 triggers	 the	 feeling	 of	role-playing.	The	sense	of	artificiality	will	rather	increase	cooperative	behaviours,	and	thereby	distort	 the	experimental	consequences.	 In	addition,	 this	role-playing	effect	 is	 more	 distinct	 when	 the	 subjects	 are	 students.	 They	 lack	 direct	 life	experience	 of	 context	 alluded	 in	 the	 loaded	 frame	 compared	 with	 real	 public	officials,	as	proposed	by	Bardsley	(2005).	 	
Due	 to	 the	 constraints	 of	 conventional	 lab	 experiment	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 it	 is	necessary	to	go	beyond	and	consider	those	more	field-like	experiments.	The	ideal	one	 is	 natural	 field	 experiment,	 while	 little	 research	 has	 done	 it	 before.	 One	example	could	be	the	experiment	conducted	by	Armantier	and	Boly’s	(2008)	in	the	context	of	bribing	to	graders	for	higher	grades.	It	is	framed	when	participants	(the	
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teachers	 or	 graders),	 unaware	 of	 being	 part	 of	 a	 study	 on	 corruption	 (they	 are	informed	only	after	 the	experiment),	have	 to	decide	whether	or	not	 to	engage	 in	bribery	when	 receiving	 exam	papers	with	 bribe	 inside.	 Although	 for	 this	master	thesis,	it	is	out	of	author’s	ability	to	conduct	such	natural	field	experiment,	the	idea	of	 concealing	 the	 true	 aim	 of	 the	 experiment	 and	 thereby	 increasing	 the	representativeness,	 can	 be	 referred	 to.	 In	 addition,	 we	 are	 going	 to	 use	 neutral	framing	instead	of	loaded	framing	commonly	used	in	conventional	lab	experiment,	in	order	to	avoid	participants’	abstaining	from	immoral	options.	While	the	subjects	will	 still	 remain	 to	 be	 students,	 who	 are	 the	most	 available	 participants	 for	 the	author,	we	deploy	the	same	idea	of	Barr	and	Serra	(2009)	to	mitigate	the	problem	of	artificiality.	They	let	students	take	the	role	of	“citizen”	and	“official”	in	the	game	and	 interact	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 public	 service,	 rather	 than	 “firm”	 and	 “official”	with	 regard	 to	 granting	 a	 license.	 It	 solves	 the	 artificiality	 problem	 applying	 to	those	of	“citizen”	role,	since	students	are	also	citizens	and	can	think	in	the	role	of	citizens.	 In	 our	 experiment,	we	 then	 frame	 the	 situation	 as	 business	 negotiation	over	a	contract,	and	students	are	invited	to	take	the	role	of	either	“sales	person”	or	“procurement	person”	on	behalf	of	 their	companies.	Also,	 this	 is	quite	 feasible	 to	invite	them	think	in	a	position	of	corporate	staff,	which	they	are	likely	to	be	after	graduation.	 Moreover,	 our	 experiment	 tends	 to	 be	 designed	 as	 framed	 field	
experiment	 despite	 that	 the	 subjects	 are	 student.	The	detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 six	dimensions	 of	 field	 context	will	 be	 demonstrated	 after	 introducing	 experimental	design	and	treatment	in	section	C.4.	 	 	 	 	
B.3	 	 Empirical	Studies	
When	the	above	experimental	studies	serve	as	the	main	basis	of	our	master	thesis,	it	 lacks	evidence	 from	real-world	data	and	may	 ignore	 the	 individual	differences	among	participants.	Thus,	 this	part	will	provide	an	overview	of	empirical	studies	related	to	corruption,	from	both	macro	and	micro	perspectives.	First,	from	a	macro	perspective,	 some	 researchers	 argue	 that	 corruption	 will	 increase	 the	 political	
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instability,	which	in	turn	reduces	economic	performance	of	a	country	especially	for	post-communist	countries	(Mo,	2001;	Zagainova,	2007).	On	the	other	hand,	others	find	that	the	corruption	was	corrected	spontaneously	in	post-privatization	period	(Kaufmann	&	Siegelbaum,	1997).	In	addition,	the	national	corruption	level	will	also	influence	the	firms’	performance.	For	instance,	employing	a	unique	firm-level	data	set	 from	22	 transition	economies,	 Javorcik	and	Wei	 (2009)	show	that	corruption	will	reduce	the	inward	foreign	direct	investment.	Furthermore,	based	on	the	three	worldwide	firm-level	surveys,	Kaufmann	and	Wei	(1999)	assert	that	firms	tend	to	spend	 more	 management	 time	 and	 confront	 higher	 expenses	 when	 engaging	bribery	activities	and	bureaucratic	negotiations.	However,	others	argue	that	such	relationship	depends	on	the	 firm	performance,	 the	rank	of	 the	politicians	bribed,	as	well	as	bribe-paying	and	bribe-taking	country	characteristics,	in	the	research	of	166	prominent	bribery	cases	from	1971	to	2007	(Cheung,	Rau	&	Stouraitis,	2012).	 	
Apart	 from	 macroeconomic	 and	 firm-level	 evidence,	 one	 cannot	 ignore	 the	individual	 characteristics,	 when	 people	 serve	 as	 the	 subjects	 and	 the	 decision	makers	 of	 every	 bribery	 activity.	 For	 example,	 the	 decision-maker’s	 own	personalities	may	result	in	different	moral	judgment	towards	bribe,	while	overall	cultural	 and	 conventional	 practice	 may	 hinder	 his	 or	 her	 behaviour	 intention.	Based	 on	 the	 data	 from	World	 Values	 Survey	 and	 the	 European	 Values	 Survey,	Torgler	 and	 Valev	 (2006)	 find	 that	 age	 exerts	 reverse	 effects	 on	 justification	 of	corruption,	 after	 controlling	 cohort	 effects.	 In	addition,	with	 the	provincial	panel	data	 of	 China,	Dong	 and	Torgler	 (2013)	 find	 that	 higher	 educational	 attainment,	higher	wage	 and	 greater	 representation	 of	women	 in	 the	 legislature	will	 lead	 to	distinctly	 less	 corruption.	 Similar	 conclusions	 are	 also	proposed	by	Hakhverdian	and	Mayne	 (2012)	 in	a	micro-macro	 interactive	study.	Another	 factor	can	be	 the	risk	aversion	level	of	participants.	As	proposed	by	Soreide	(2009),	the	higher	level	of	risk	aversion	will	lead	to	the	higher	propensity	to	offer	bribery,	especially	when	gift	giving	is	a	common	practice	among	the	current	business	context,	based	on	the	survey	of	Norwegian	firms,	where	top	managers	in	82	exporting	firms	responded	
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to	 about	 100	 questions	 on	 corruption.	 Although	 faced	 with	 the	 probability	 of	getting	 caught	 and	 sanctioned,	 they	 may	 be	 concerned	 of	 other	 competitors	offering	 bribery,	 which	 may	 undermine	 its	 position	 in	 obtaining	 the	 contract.	Another	 research	 also	 finds	 that	 beliefs	 and	 values	 will	 influence	 individuals’	ethical	decision.	For	 instance,	 individual	 factor	of	 formalism	and	the	surrounding	cultural	environment	have	significant	correlation	with	ethical	decisions	in	a	survey	of	master	and	Ph.D.	students	(Langlais	&	Bent,	2013).	Despite	of	these	findings,	the	current	empirical	research	on	the	firm-	and	individual-	level	is	very	limited	due	to	the	data	availability.	 	
B.4	 	 Research	Gap	and	Inspirations	for	the	thesis	
In	 the	 context	 of	 business	 negotiation,	 real-world	 case	 analysis	 has	 been	widely	appraised,	while	 still	 faced	with	 inevitable	 limitations	 on	 the	 access	 of	 the	 data.	Especially	 regarding	 the	 bribery	 and	 corruption,	 with	 the	 inherent	 nature	 of	
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unethical	 and	unobservable,	 it	 tends	 to	be	 impossible	 to	handle	 the	general	 case	for	all	companies	without	being	exposed	to	the	public.	However,	as	mentioned	by	Moosmayer	 et	 al.,	 (2012),	 the	 conventional	 laboratory	 experiments	 are	 usually	subjected	 to	 framing	 bias	 and	 confounder	 limitations,	 which	 necessitates	 extra	cautions	on	controlling	experimental	variables	and	on	interpreting	the	outcomes.	Moreover,	when	 an	 individual	 is	making	 a	 decision	 of	 bribing,	 one	will	 not	 only	consider	maximizing	his	payoff	as	a	rational	and	programmed	robot.	Instead,	many	factors,	 such	 as	 trust,	 reciprocity	 and	 individual	 personalities,	 will	 influence	 his	decision-making	 process,	 resulting	 in	 infeasibility	 of	 mere	 theoretical	 approach.	Figure	2	provides	a	summary	of	the	limitation	of	each	research	method.	
Therefore,	 this	master	thesis	attempts	to	design	a	quasi	 framed	field	experiment,	which	is	supposed	to	fulfil	 the	research	gap	existed	in	current	research	methods:	that	is	mitigating	the	problem	of	rationality	assumption	of	game-theoretic	model;	unavailability	 of	 bribery	 data	 for	 real	 business	 negotiation;	 and	 the	 artificiality	problem	of	conventional	lab	experiment.	
Based	on	the	literature	discussed	above,	there	are	two	stages	of	bribery	activities:	 	who	are	more	likely	to	engage	in	corruption;	and	how	bribe	influences	the	ultimate	contract	price	in	the	context	of	business	negotiation.	When	some	research	focuses	on	 the	 first	 stage,	 such	 as	 exploring	 the	 personal	 characteristics	 and	 cultural	backgrounds,	 others	 concentrate	 on	 the	 second	 stage.	 For	 our	 experiment,	 we	attempt	 to	 test	 both	 stages	 of	 bribe	 in	 the	 context	 of	 business	 negotiation.	 A	questionnaire	 regarding	basic	backgrounds	 and	personalities	 is	 required	 to	 fulfil	after	participants	finish	their	negotiation	sessions.	In	accordance	to	the	findings	of	current	 literature	 mentioned	 above,	 questions	 about	 Age,	 Gender,	 Education,	
Financial	 Condition,	 and	 Risk	 Aversion	 will	 be	 included	 as	 control	 variables.	 In	addition,	 there	 are	 also	 questions	 regarding	 Human	 Values,	 which	 serve	 as	 the	main	 estimation	 variables,	 since	 the	 literature	 regarding	 the	 direct	 link	 to	corruption	still	remains	to	be	completed.	 	
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Concerning	 Human	 Values,	 there	 are	 different	 types	 of	 measures	 pertaining	 to	different	dimensions	of	personal	traits	and	different	national	backgrounds.	In	this	thesis,	Schwartz’s	Theory	of	Basic	Values	for	human	beings	will	be	deployed	as	a	comprehensive	 and	 coherent	 measurement,	 which	 has	 been	 widely	 adopted	 for	the	 research	 of	 management	 unethicality.	 It	 denotes	 10	 universally	 applicable	motivational	 values,	 distinguished	 along	 two	 competing	 dimensions:	 OPENNESS	
TO	 CHANGE	 (1stimulation,	 2self-direction,	 3hedonism)	 versus	 CONSERVATION	(4tradition,	 5conformity,	 6security),	 and	 SELF-ENHANCEMENT	 (7power,	8achievement)	 versus	 SELF-TRANSCENDENCE	 (9universalism,	 10benevolence)	(Schwartz,	 1992,	 2012).	 OPENNESS	 TO	 CHANGE	 captures	 values	 that	 underline	independence	 of	 thought,	 action,	 and	 feelings	 and	 readiness	 for	 change,	 while	CONSERVATION	 refers	 to	 values	 that	 emphasize	 order,	 self-restriction,	preservation	of	the	past,	and	resistance	to	change;	SELF-ENHANCEMENT	captures	
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values	 that	 emphasize	 pursuit	 of	 one's	 own	 interests	 and	 relative	 success	 and	dominance	 over	 others,	 while	 SELF-TRANSCENDENCE	 refers	 to	 values	 that	emphasize	 concern	 for	 the	welfare	 and	 interests	of	 others.	 In	 addition,	 Schwartz	(2012)	 also	 provides	 a	 dynamic	 structure	 of	 value	 relations	 (see	 Figure	 3).	
SELF-ENHANCEMENT	and	OPENNESS	TO	CHANGE	on	the	top	panel	mainly	regulate	the	personal	interests	and	characteristic	of	each	individual.	On	the	other	hand,	the	values	of	bottom	panel	demonstrate	how	people	relate	 themselves	 to	 the	society	and	interdependent	relationship.	Also,	by	comparing	left-	and	right-side	of	Figure	3,	one	can	distinguish	between	self-protection	values,	when	people	seek	to	avoid	losses	and	self-expansive	values,	when	people	pursue	gains.	 	 	
Based	on	research	findings	on	individual	motivations	and	ethical	decisions,	people	with	SELF-ENHANCEMENT	value	are	more	likely	to	engage	in	unethical	behaviours	than	 those	with	 value	 of	SELF-TRANSCENDENCE	 (Fritzsche	&	Oz,	 2007;	 Crossan,	Mazutis,	 &	 Seijts,	 2013).	 Additionally,	 when	 bribery	 activities	 inevitably	 trigger	negatively	 externalities	 on	 others,	 it	 is	 logical	 to	 assume	 people	 who	 care	 for	others	(i.e.	altruism)	are	less	likely	to	engage	in	corruption,	compared	to	those	who	chase	 for	 individual	 interests	 and	 self-centred	 satisfaction.	 With	 regard	 to	
CONSERVATION,	 it	 is	 a	 typical	 characteristic	 of	 communist	 and	 post-communist	societies,	where	corruption	tends	to	be	prevalent	as	asserted	by	most	researchers.	On	the	one	hand,	people	with	traditional	value	usually	define	themselves	based	on	the	 interpersonal	 relationship	 and	 rely	 on	 such	 connections,	 especially	 when	institutional	 settings	 (e.g.	 regulation,	 laws	 and	 contract	 power)	 are	 not	standardized.	As	 a	 result,	 reciprocity	 is	 promoted,	 and	 thereby	bribery	 activities	become	 common	 and	 predominant.	 However,	 other	 researchers	 argue	 that	unethical	 practices	 involve	 breaking	 traditional	 patterns	 of	 behaviour	 and	violating	expectations	and	norms.	Thus,	people	who	value	CONSERVATION	seek	to	avoid	 conflicts	 and	maintain	 social	 orders.	When	 corruption	 is	 viewed	 as	 illicit,	such	 values	may	 lead	 to	 decreasing	 bribery	 engagement	 (Steenhaut	 &	 Kenhove,	2006).	 Thus,	 the	 influences	 of	 CONSERVATION	 still	 remain	 contentious	 if	 the	
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national	 differences	 are	 controlled	 (Shafer,	 Fukukawa	 &	 Lee,	 2006).	 On	 the	contrary,	 its	 competing	value	of	OPENNESS	TO	CHANGE	 is	 likely	 to	be	 congruent	with	an	unethical	disposition,	since	it	provides	the	opportunity	to	experience	some	variety	 and	 stimulation	 through	 change	 from	 established	 patterns	 (Steenhaut	 &	Kenhove,	2006).	 	 	 	
Overall,	Table	4	(see	 I.	Appendices)	demonstrates	 the	main	measurements	 in	 the	questionnaire	and	brief	descriptions	respectively.	
According	to	the	literature	of	current	bribery	research	and	some	inspirations	from	paper	related	to	ethical	decision-making,	 the	following	draft	estimation	functions	are	presented:	 	
• Stage	1:	𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑣 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑛ℎ𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐＋ + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙       (1)	
• Stage	2:	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 𝑎 + 𝜃𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒 + 𝑏!𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 𝑏!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑣 + 𝑏!𝑆𝑒𝐸𝑛ℎ𝑎 + 𝑏!𝑆𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐 + 𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙       (2)	
Note:	 	Bribe_Accept:	dummy	variable,	0	if	rejected	and	1	if	accepted;	Price_Increase:	increase	of	contract	price	after	cooperation	(taking	the	bribe);	Open:	openness	to	change;	Consv:	conservation;	SeEnha:	self-enhancement;	SeTransc:	self-transcendence;	Bribe:	bribing	amount;	Control:	control	variables,	including	age,	gender,	education,	financial	condition	and	risk	aversion;	𝛼,	a:	constant	term;	𝛽,	 𝛾,	 𝜃,	b,	c:	parameter	of	each	variable	respectively.	
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 Experimental	Methodology	C.
C.1	 	 Experimental	Design	and	Treatment	
Consider	 the	 following	 situation:	 the	 firm	 A	 produces	 a	 semi-finished	 product,	which	is	an	important	input	for	the	firm	B.	So	firm	A	decides	to	delegate	the	selling	responsibility	to	its	sales	person.	He	will	approach	the	procurement	person	of	firm	B	and	 they	will	negotiate	on	 the	 contract	price	of	 this	product.	 In	addition,	 their	bonus	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 final	 price	 settled.	 Since	 only	 they	 two	 attend	 the	contract	negotiation	session,	there	exist	an	opportunity	for	them	to	cooperate.	The	sales	person	may	bribe	 the	procuring	person.	 If	 the	procurement	person	accepts	the	bribe	for	private	interest,	he	has	to	raise	the	contract	price	higher	and	let	his	company	to	afford	such	costs.	
We	take	university	students	as	the	subjects	and	the	experiment	is	neutrally	framed.	Each	 negotiation	 round	will	 consist	 of	 two	 students	 as	 a	 pair,	 taking	 the	 role	 of	procurement	 person	 and	 sales	 person	 respectively.	 In	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	negotiation	 experiment	 will	 proceed	 as	 expected,	 all	 sales	 persons	 will	 be	disguised	 by	 our	 research	 assistants.	 Their	 behaviours	 will	 be	 highly	 controlled	and	 their	price	offers	are	determined	by	certain	 function	 f.	Thus,	 all	participants	will	 take	 the	 role	 of	 procurement	 persons.	 In	 addition,	 the	 compensations	 for	participation	will	depend	on	the	certain	rates	and	final	settled	contract	price.	
The	experiment	will	restore	the	above	situation	in	the	following	way	(see	the	game	tree	 in	 Figure	 5):	 the	 bargaining	 zone	 will	 be	 provided	 and	 a	 virtual	 currency	Gilbert	(G)	will	be	used	to	avoid	real-world	price	associated	with	the	product	(Barr	&	Serra,	2009).	The	bargaining	zone	 is	defined	as	 the	price	 interval	between	 the	walk-away	 price	 of	 sales	 person,	 which	 is	 simplified	 as	 the	 costs	 of	 the	semi-finished	 product	 (Cost=70G),	 and	 the	 highest	 price	 procurement	 party	 can	accept,	 which	 is	 simplified	 as	 the	 price	 of	 end	 product	 (PriceEnd=100G).	Additionally,	 the	compensation	rate	 for	procurement	person	Rp	 is	set	at	0.2	Euro	
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for	an	extra	Gilbert	below	100G.	The	rate	for	sales	person	Rs	is	set	at	2	Euro	for	an	extra	Gilbert	above	70G	in	the	experimental	scenario.	 	
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 game,	 the	 procurement	 person	 is	 required	 to	 raise	 their	initial	 offers	 as	Cost	 of	 product	 (i.e.	 P0=70G),	 and	 then	 for	 the	 sales	 person	 (i.e.	research	assistant),	PriceEnd	(i.e.	Ps=100G)	should	be	raised	as	his	first	response.	Subsequently,	the	procurement	person	will	decide	whether	to	agree	with	100G	or	disagree.	If	he	agrees,	the	contract	price	will	be	100G.	If	he	disagrees,	he	then	offers	his	 counter	 price	 as	 Pp=P1.	 Then,	 there	 is	 a	 chance	 move	 based	 on	 function	 f:	f(Pp)=(1-0.8(P1-P0)/P0)*Ps	with	30%	probability;	 f(Pp)=	 (1-0.8(P1-P0)/P0)*Ps	with	40%	probability;	and	f(Pp)=	(1-1.2(P1-P0)/P0)*Ps	with	30%	probability.	If	the	f(Pp)	given	by	chance	is	equal	or	lower	than	P1,	the	sales	person	(i.e.	research	assistant)	will	 agree	 at	 price=	 P1.	 If	 the	 f(Pp)	 given	 higher	 than	 P1,	 the	 sales	 person	 will	disagree,	and	offer	the	counter	price	Ps=	f(Pp).	Afterwards,	the	procurement	person	
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will	decide	whether	to	agree	or	disagree	with	Ps.	This	process	will	continue	until	either	of	them	agrees	and	settle	the	contract	price	as	Pnobribe.	
After	 achieving	 the	 first	 agreed	 contract	 price,	 the	 sales	 person	 (i.e.	 research	assistant)	will	say	that	“The	experimental	session	now	has	finished”,	and	then	start	to	reveal	his	own	compensation	rate.	Since	his	compensation	rate	is	much	higher	than	the	rate	of	his	counterpart,	the	procurement	person,	he	will	propose	that	they	can	 COOPERATE	 to	 raise	 the	 price	 higher.	 In	 return,	 he	 can	 share	 part	 of	 his	additional	 compensation.	 If	 the	procurement	person	accepts,	he	will	propose	 the	amount	he	wishes	to	share	(i.e.	Bribe)	and	the	corresponding	new	contract	price	 	(Pbribe)	that	he	thinks	is	appropriate.	The	payoffs	of	procurement	and	sales	persons	are	 ((100-Pbribe)*0.2+Bribe)	 and	 ((Pbribe-70)*2-Bribe)	 respectively	 if	 bribe	 is	accepted;	 and	 are	 (100-Pnobribe)*0.2	 and	 (Pnobribe-70)*2	 respectively	 if	 bribe	 is	rejected.	
The	 mechanism	 of	 this	 game	 depends	 on	 the	 asymmetric	 compensation	 rates	between	two	paired	students,	 is	described	in	the	Figure	6.	Specifically,	the	aim	of	sales	 person	 is	 to	 bargain	 the	 contract	 price	 as	 high	 as	 possible.	 If	 negotiation	reaches	an	agreement,	he	can	gain	Rp*(Price-70).	On	the	other	hand,	 the	goal	 for	procurement	 person	 in	 experimental	 scenario	 is	 to	 settle	 the	 price	 as	 low	 as	possible,	 and	his	 compensation	will	 be	Rs*(100-Price).	 In	 our	 experiments,	Rs	 (2	Euro/Gilbert)	 is	 set	 deliberately	 higher	 than	 Rp	 (0.2	 Euro/Gilbert),	 and	 thereby	there	 exists	 an	 opportunity	 for	 COOPERATION	 between	 two	 parties.	 If	 contract	price	increases,	the	sales	person	will	earn	much	more	compensation	than	what	the	procurement	person	will	lose.	Therefore,	the	procurement	person	may	agree	to	set	the	contract	price	higher	than	what	agreed	before,	provided	that	the	sales	person	shares	 part	 of	 his	 compensation	 in	 return.	 As	 a	 result,	 both	 parties	 can	 obtain	higher	compensation	from	the	author	compared	to	that	no	COOPERATION	occurs.	Therefore,	this	experiment	can	imitate	the	real	case	of	business	price	negotiation	in	a	bribery-possible	context	as	 following:	The	compensation	shared	by	the	sales	
	 26	
person	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 the	 bribe;	 Both	 of	 bribe-giving	 (sales	 person)	 and	bribe-taking	 (procurement	party)	parties	benefit	 by	 cooperation;	 the	 author	will	simulate	 the	 procuring	 company,	 which	 suffers	 the	 negative	 externalities	 of	 the	bribe.	When	 the	 company	 has	 to	 afford	 higher	 contract	 price	without	 improved	product	quality,	the	author	also	has	to	pay	more	compensation	to	her	participants	with	deficient	research	data	in	participants’	perspective.	
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C.2	 	 Experimental	Arrangements	
The	 whole	 experiment	 included	 two	 phases:	 first,	 the	 promotion	 phase	 was	intended	 to	 distribute	 experimental	 information	 and	 call	 for	 participants.	 All	subjects	 were	 recruited	 from	 undergraduate	 and	 master	 students	 of	 The	University	of	Tartu	and	most	of	them	majored	in	business	related	subjects.	We	sent	emails	 about	 our	 experiment	 through	 department	 secretary,	 posted	 information	on	 social	media,	 and	 held	 short	 recruitment	 talks	 after	 lectures.	 Those	who	 had	interests	would	be	invited	to	sign	up	on	Doodle	for	the	time	they	wishes	to	come.	 	
Second	 phase	 was	 the	 business	 negotiation	 experiment.	 It	 was	 conducted	 in	 the	School	 of	 Economics	 and	 Business	 Administration	 of	 University	 of	 Tartu.	 Before	the	 experiment,	 the	participant	was	 invited	 to	draw	 lots	 from	a	dark	box,	which	would	 decide	 their	 roles	 either	 as	 a	 procurement	 person	 or	 a	 sales	 person,	 and	their	compensation	rates.	Although	their	role	and	compensation	rate	was	definite,	this	 approach	 introduced	 randomness	 of	 compensation	 rates	 in	 participants’	perspective.	The	paired	research	assistant	did	the	same	process	as	the	participant.	Afterwards,	 the	 participant	would	 be	 invited	 to	 sit	 in	 room	 A,	 and	 the	 research	assistant	would	go	to	room	B.	I	would	then	give	the	Participant	Consent	Form	and	Participant	 Script	 (see	 I.	 Appendices)	 to	 the	 participant.	 The	 following	 points	would	 be	 verbally	 explained	 by	 me	 again	 to	 ensure	 that	 he	 could	 totally	understand:	
• “Since	you	are	taking	the	role	of	procurement	person,	your	objective	is	to	argue	the	price	as	low	as	possible.”	
• “You	are	required	to	give	the	 initial	offer	at	70G,	which	is	defined	as	the	bottom	line	of	the	bargaining	zone.”	
• “Your	compensation	for	participation	will	depend	on	the	final	agreement	you	 can	 make	 with	 your	 counterpart.	 For	 example,	 if	 you	 agree	 at	 the	price	 of	 85G,	 you	 can	 earn	 additional	 (100-85)*0.2=3	 Euros	 apart	 from	
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the	show-up	fee.”	
• “You	have	10	minutes	to	negotiate,	and	if	you	cannot	reach	an	agreement	within	10	minutes,	we	will	assume	the	contract	fails.	As	a	result,	only	the	show-up	fee	will	be	remunerated.”	
Afterwards,	 I	 would	 go	 to	 room	 B	 and	 asked	 the	 research	 assistant	 to	 come	 to	room	A.	Both	of	them	would	be	presented	with	a	computer	respectively,	and	were	told	 that	you	could	use	 it	 to	calculate	numbers	and	as	a	 timer.	The	computer	 for	research	 assistant	 contained	 the	 programmed	 calculus	 (see	 I.	 Appendices	 for	detailed	 codes),	 which	 served	 as	 the	 chance	 move	 in	 the	 game	 tree	 (Figure	 5).	Based	on	it,	the	research	assistant	would	give	his	counter	prices.	They	two	would	then	conduct	the	negotiation	face-to-face	and	alone	in	room	A.	After	ten	minutes,	I	would	interrupt	and	they	would	tell	me	the	agreed	price.	Based	on	this	price,	I	will	give	the	compensation.	Finally,	I	invited	them	to	fulfil	the	questionnaire.	 	
C.3	 	 Experimental	Controls	
As	mentioned	 above,	 three	 research	 assistants	 are	 deployed	 as	 sales	 persons	 in	order	 to	 retain	 the	 control	 over	 the	 experiment.	To	avoid	 subjective	variation	of	different	research	assistants	and	of	different	negotiation	sessions,	several	methods	are	 deployed.	 First,	 their	 decisions	 of	 price	 and	 whether	 to	 agree	 with	 their	counterparts’	 prices	 are	 based	 on	 function	 f.	 In	 addition,	 the	 research	 assistants	are	 required	 to	 follow	 the	 text	 script	 (see	 I.	 Appendices),	 which	 contains	 the	specific	sentences	they	are	expected	to	say	in	the	negotiation	experiment.	Trough	this	approach,	we	can	alleviate	the	endogenous	problem	caused	by	indeterminate	behaviours,	 and	 thus	 improve	 the	 comparability	 between	 different	 pairs	(Berninghaus	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Moreover,	 when	 cooperation	 or	 corruption	 is	 a	reciprocity	 process	 established	 on	 trust,	 the	 dynamic	 facial	 expression	 of	 sales	persons	 also	 matters.	 As	 asserted	 by	 Morioka	 et	 al.	 (2015),	 smile	 accompanied	with	 positive	 verbal	 expressions	 will	 engender	 higher	 trust	 tendency,	 while	 the	
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presence	 of	 negative	 verbal	 expressions	 will	 trigger	 totally	 inversed	 effects.	Besides,	 people	will	 also	deduce	others’	 personalities	 and	 trustworthiness	based	on	 their	 manifested	 static	 physical	 features,	 such	 as	 appearance	 and	 clothing	(Naumann	et	al.,	2009).	Therefore,	 the	 sales	persons,	 i.e.	our	 research	assistants,	will	be	trained	to	follow	unified	facial	expression	rules	and	dressing	codes	in	order	to	avoid	potential	distortion.	 	 	
Apart	 from	 the	 individual	 factors	 of	 research	 assistants,	 two	 elements	 of	 the	institutional	 elements	 regarding	 bribery	 should	 also	 be	 considered.	 First,	 as	demonstrated	by	previous	 research,	 the	negative	externalities	on	 the	 third	party	will	 significantly	 influence	 the	bribery	behaviours.	 In	our	experiment,	despite	no	explicitly	 statement,	 it	 is	 inherently	 endowed.	 Since	 the	 experiment	 is	 neutrally	framed,	 accepting	 bribe	 (i.e.	 share	 of	 additional	 compensation)	 and	 changing	contact	price	are	not	expected	as	normal	experimental	behaviours.	In	other	words,	if	the	participant	agrees	to	cooperate	with	the	research	assistant	and	make	a	false	price	declaration,	the	interests	of	the	author	are	impaired	as	higher	compensations	are	 paid	 with	 less	 accurate	 research	 data.	 Second,	 since	 the	 scrutiny	 and	punishment	systems	will	not	serve	as	a	key	treatment	for	the	experiment,	they	are	not	stated	explicitly.	Additionally,	when	this	experiment	is	announced	as	research	collaborated	 with	 the	 professor	 and	 the	 master	 student,	 participants	 will	spontaneously	make	an	assumption	of	adverse	results	if	this	unethical	behaviour	is	detected.	 Also,	 without	 knowing	 specific	 probability	 of	 exposure	 and	 amount	 of	losses,	the	situation	confronted	by	participants	is	under	uncertainty	instead	of	risk.	It	 suppresses	 complex	 quantitative	 calculations,	 and	 different	 utility	 engendered	by	different	 individuals.	 Furthermore,	 uncertainty	 situations	 are	more	neutral	 in	terms	 of	 genders,	 as	 women	 are	 more	 risk-averse	 in	 risky	 gambles	 (Sarin	 &	Wieland,	2016).	Despite	that	punishment	is	one	of	most	important	features	related	to	corruption,	we	can	temporarily	skip	this	problem	in	this	thesis.	 	
C.4	 	 Field	Context	of	Business	Negotiation	Experiment	
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As	we	discussed	in	B.2	Experimental	Studies,	the	experiment	of	this	thesis	aims	to	overcome	 some	 limitations	 of	 conventional	 laboratory	 experiment,	 and	 thereby	resemble	a	framed	field	experiment,	except	for	standard	subject	pool.	This	section	will	 analyse	 the	 six	 dimensions	 as	 proposed	 by	 Harrison	 and	 List	 (2004)	 to	determine	the	field	context	of	our	business	negotiation	experiment.	
First,	the	nature	of	the	subject	pool	is	the	standard	in	our	experiment,	and	it	is	the	same	as	in	conventional	laboratory	experiment.	On	the	one	hand,	it	will	be	always	better	 if	we	 can	go	 to	 field	and	 recruit	 the	 target	population	as	 the	nonstandard	subjects	who	 are	 real	 procurement	 persons	 in	 position.	 For	 example,	 Haigh	 and	List	 (2004)	 use	 traders	 at	 the	 Chicago	 Board	 of	 Trade.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	students	 are	 the	 most	 available	 participants	 for	 the	 author.	 We	 recruit	international	 students	 from	 University	 of	 Tartu,	 which	 allows	 for	 some	socio-demographic	variations.	In	addition,	despite	that	the	education	backgrounds	of	 our	participants	 are	quite	 concentrated	 (most	of	 them	are	of	 business-related	majors,	and	at	undergraduate	or	master	education	level),	one	can	argue	that	these	cluster	of	people	have	great	potential	to	become	sales	or	procurement	persons	in	company,	compared	to	those	with	other	majors	or	education	levels.	 	
The	 second	 dimension	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 information	 that	 subjects	 bring	 to	 the	
task.	 While	 the	 nonstandard	 subject	 pool	 may	 bring	 experience	 with	 the	commodity	or	the	task	to	the	experiment,	students	do	not	have	much	experience	of	business	 negotiation	 and	 comprehension	 of	 business	 ethics.	 For	 instance,	 when	situated	 in	an	experiment,	 real	procurement	persons	will	automatically	associate	bribe	 taking	with	 severity	 of	 corporate	 profits	 shrink,	 the	 demise	 of	 career,	 the	serious	legal	repercussion,	and	the	correlated	exposure	risks.	However,	accepting	bribe	 and	 cheating	 on	 experimenter	 are	 not	 expected	 by	 the	 students	 in	 an	experiment	 and	 thereby	 this	 lack	 of	 information	 triggers	 uncertainty	 and	ambivalence.	Those	subjects	who	are	risk	aversion	may	require	an	additional	risk	premium	when	 considering	 taking	 the	 bribe	 in	 the	 experimental	 scenario,	 apart	
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from	 the	 risk	 premium	 required	 in	 the	 real	 situation.	 This	 will	 weaken	 the	experimental	 result	 with	 respect	 to	 representativeness,	 so	 its	 interpretations	should	be	very	cautious.	 	 	 	 	 	
Third,	the	nature	of	commodity	refers	to	the	artificiality	of	the	goods	or	serves	used	in	 the	 experiment.	 In	 our	 experiment,	 instead	 of	 physical	 good,	 we	 employ	 the	abstractly	defined	good	(i.e.	 the	contract	of	an	artificial	product),	which	has	been	widely	used	in	experiments	since	Chamberlin	(1948)	and	Smith	(1962).	Although	it	 suffers	 criticism	on	 influencing	 participants’	 behaviours,	 one	 cannot	 reject	 the	field	 characteristic	 of	 an	 experiment	 merely	 by	 not	 having	 an	 actual	 good.	 For	example,	 in	 the	 research	of	Bateman	et	 al.	 (1997),	 subjects	 are	 required	 to	 elicit	valuations	 over	 pizza	 and	 dessert	 vouchers	 for	 a	 local	 restaurant.	 Despite	 that	these	commodities	were	not	actual	pizza	or	dessert	themselves,	vouchers	convey	the	possession	of	them,	which	are	not	abstract.	Similarly	in	our	case,	the	contract	itself	 is	 abstract,	 while	 the	 subjects	 are	 entitled	 to	 real	monetary	 compensation	based	on	contract	price	settlement,	which	is	not	abstract.	 	
The	 fourth	 field	characteristic	 is	 the	nature	of	 the	 task	or	 trading	rules	applied.	A	crucial	question	is	whether	the	task	the	subjects	are	asked	to	perform	will	develop	successful	 heuristics.	 For	 example,	 the	 task	 of	 the	 conventional	 lab	 experiment	usually	seems	to	be	abstract	to	its	subjects	and	thereby	it's	meaningless	for	them	to	 think	 about	 how	would	 they	make	 decisions	were	 they	 to	 find	 themselves	 in	such	a	situation.	In	addition,	there	is	less	control	over	how	the	subjects	themselves	will	impose	on	the	abstract	experimental	task.	With	regards	to	our	case,	at	the	first	glance,	the	task	for	the	procurement	person	is	to	squeeze	down	the	contract	price	and	 reach	 an	 agreement	 with	 their	 counterpart,	 which	 is	 relatively	 abstract	 for	students.	However,	when	we	test	for	the	hypotheses,	the	real	task	at	the	backstage	is	whether	 to	 accept	 COOPERATION	and	 cheat	 on	 the	 experimenter.	 In	 addition,	the	 artificial	 context	 of	 business	 negotiation	 applied	 in	 our	 experiment	 can	 be	taken	 as	 surrounding	 environment,	 based	 on	 which	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 the	
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participant	 if	 the	 sales	 person	proposes	 the	 COOPERATION	 suggestion.	 Also,	 the	employment	 of	 research	 assistants	 as	 sales	 party	 will	 help	 our	 subjects	 to	 fully	understand	all	relevant	aspects	of	this	task.	
Concerning	fifth	dimension,	the	nature	of	the	stakes,	the	valuation	process	subjects	will	 differ	 when	 encountered	 different	 level	 of	 stakes	 in	 the	 field	 and	 lab.	 For	instance,	subjects	may	not	value	prices	seriously	when	it	is	below	one	dollar,	while	tens	of	or	hundred	of	dollars	will	lead	to	different	valuation	approach	(Harrison	&	List,	2004).	Thus,	biased	results	are	expected	when	an	experiment	involves	trivial	stakes.	 There	 are	 three	main	 approaches	 aiming	 to	 alleviate	 this	 problem.	 First,	one	may	let	subjects	earn	real	stakes	in	the	lab	(Rutström	&	Williams,	2000).	This	is	already	applied	 in	our	experiment,	and	the	average	stakes	 involved	are	3	euro	without	cooperation	and	much	more	with	cooperation.	The	second	solution	 is	 to	run	 experiment	 in	 developing	 countries	 so	 that	 the	 stakes	 constitute	 for	 larger	proportion	of	the	average	income	(Cameron	1999).	When	communicating	with	our	participants	after	the	experiment,	we	find	that	one	of	the	most	important	reasons	for	 the	 student	 to	 choose	 studying	 in	 University	 of	 Tartu	 is	 that	 the	 education	quality	 is	 good	when	 the	 tuition	 fee	 and	 living	 expenses	 in	 Estonia	 is	 relatively	cheap	 compared	 with	 other	 European	 countries.	 It	 to	 some	 extent	 allows	 us	 to	assume	that	our	subjects	are	not	that	rich,	and	the	stakes	involved	does	count	for	a	fraction	 of	 their	 daily	 expenses.	 In	 addition,	 we	 also	 record	 their	 financial	conditions	in	the	questionnaire	(see	I.	Appendices,	Table	4),	and	its	influences	will	be	 analysed	 in	 the	 section	 D.	 Last,	 Bohm	 (1994)	 emphasizes	 the	 significance	 of	recruiting	 the	 subjects	 who	 care	 about	 the	 task	 and	 thereby	 valuing	 stakes	seriously.	 In	our	case,	all	 subjected	are	recruited	on	a	voluntary	basis	so	 that	we	can	suppose	that	they	are	not	indifferent	to	the	experimental	“tasks”.	However,	as	mentioned	above,	the	real	task	is	about	COOPERATION	acceptance.	If	participants	do	 not	 participate	 for	 the	monetary	 compensation	 at	 the	 beginning,	 whether	 to	earn	more	money	may	not	enter	their	valuation	process.	It	remains	contentious	if	these	types	of	participants	will	persist	 in	the	same	non-monetary	objective	when	
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chasing	their	careers.	 	
The	 last	 field	 characteristic	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 environment	 that	 the	 subject	
operates	in.	Usually	in	a	laboratory	experiment,	the	environment	is	fully	controlled	and	the	stressors	that	one	is	interested	will	vary	and	is	emphasized.	However,	this	will	not	always	happen	in	reality,	since	a	lot	of	other	factors	will	draw	the	attention	of	 individuals,	 and	 thereby	 their	 responses	 to	 the	 stressors	 may	 change.	 With	respect	to	our	experiment,	participants	are	settled	in	a	classroom	alone,	where	the	physical	 surroundings	 resemble	 a	 typical	 place	 for	 a	 business	 negotiation.	 In	addition,	the	human	intervention	between	the	participant	and	research	assistant	is	nature	and	there	 is	no	monitor	of	 their	behaviours.	Furthermore,	 the	real	 task	 is	carried	out	when	the	participants	are	unaware	of	being	part	of	the	experiment.	In	other	 words,	 when	 offered	 with	 COOPERATION	 suggestion,	 they	 suppose	 the	experiment	 of	 price	 negotiation	 has	 already	 finished,	 and	 COOPERATION	 is	something	 outside	 the	 experiment.	 Therefore,	 the	 field	 context	 in	 our	 case	demonstrates	good	performance	on	the	nature	of	environment.	 	
Overall,	we	can	define	our	business	negotiation	experiment	as	a	quasi	framed	field	experiment	 according	 to	 Harrison	 and	 List’s	 (2004)	 six	 field	 characteristics.	Despite	that	the	subjects	are	standard	and	they	bring	little	related	information	into	the	 experiment,	 the	 commodity	 and	 task	 that	 they	 can	 use,	 and	 the	 stakes	 and	environment	embraced	are	more	or	less	of	field	features.	
C.5	 	 Hypotheses	
Based	on	the	analysis	of	 literature	review	(B.4	Research	Gap	and	Inspirations	for	the	 thesis),	 we	 develop	 the	 following	 hypotheses	 to	 be	 tested	 through	 the	experiment:	
Hypothesis	 1:	 Individuals	 with	 higher	 level	 of	 OPENNESS	 TO	 CHANGE	 are	 more	likely	to	accept	the	bribe	(cooperate).	
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Hypothesis	 2:	 Individuals	with	higher	 level	 of	CONSERVATION	are	more	 likely	 to	accept	the	bribe	(cooperate).	(In	literature	review	mentioned	above,	there	are	two	contradictory	 views	 on	 the	 influences	 of	 value	 of	 conservation,	 so	we	make	 this	hypothesis	for	now.)	 	
Hypothesis	3:	Individuals	with	higher	level	of	SELF-ENHANCEMENT	are	more	likely	to	accept	the	bribe	(cooperate).	
Hypothesis	 4:	 Individuals	with	 lower	 level	 of	 SELF-TRANSCENDECNCE	 are	more	likely	to	accept	the	bribe	(cooperate).	
Hypothesis	 5:	The	BRIBE	amount	 and	 contract	PRICE	are	positively	 correlated	 in	the	perspective	of	the	participant.	
	 	
	 36	
 Data	Description	and	Estimation	Results	D.
In	 total,	 we	 hold	 43	 sessions	 of	 business	 negotiation,	 and	 among	 them	 17	participants	 accept	 bribe	 and	 agree	 to	 cooperate.	 Figure	 7	 demonstrates	 the	comparison	between	the	price	before	cooperation	(Price_nobribe),	and	price	after	cooperation	 (Price_bribe)	 for	 each	 session.	 The	 sessions	 that	 only	 have	Price_nobribe	are	those	when	the	participant	reject	to	cooperate.	In	addition,	when	cooperation	 will	 benefit	 both	 parties’	 personal	 interests,	 Figure	 8	 captures	 the	additional	 compensation	of	 sales	person	 (i.e.	 (Price_bribe-Price_nobribe)*Rs)	due	to	cooperation	and	the	share	(i.e.	Bribe)	the	procurement	requires.	 	
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In	theory,	the	equilibrium	of	the	game	and	the	optimal	choice	for	the	participants	is	to	settle	contract	price	at	100G,	the	upper	limit,	and	ask	for	the	entire	amount	of	the	additional	compensation.	However,	in	our	experiment,	it	is	apparent	that	most	participants	will	 not	 require	 the	 entire	 amount	 of	 the	 additional	 compensations	from	the	research	assistants	except	for	session	14	and	41,	although	in	this	game	it	is	 totally	 decided	 by	 them.	 Thus,	 it	 verifies	 that	 the	 invalidity	 of	 rationality	assumption	in	reality.	It	also	to	some	extent	demonstrates	the	existence	of	fairness	and	reciprocity,	although	in	a	neutrally	framed	experiment,	the	problem	moral	cost	is	mitigated.	The	average	additional	compensation	earned	by	sales	persons	is	13.7	euro	and	the	average	share	or	bribe	is	8.1	euro,	for	the	samples	with	cooperation	achieved.	 The	 participants	 may	 ask	 for	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 additional	compensation,	 but	 the	 sense	 of	 fairness	 and	 willingness	 to	 reciprocate	 their	counterparts	 lead	 to	 average	 increase	 of	 5.6	 euro	 regarding	 research	 assistants’	payoffs.	 	
D.1	 	 Stage	1:	Who	Are	More	Likely	To	Accept	The	Bribe	 	
Before	 conducting	 econometric	 analysis	 and	 estimation,	 we	 first	 present	 a	summary	of	variables,	categorized	by	whether	participants	agree	to	take	bribe	and	cooperate	(see	Table	9).	The	p	values	in	this	table	indicate	whether	the	means	of	two	categories	significantly	differ	based	on	analysis	of	variance.	 	
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Bribe_Accept	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable,	 which	 equals	 1	 if	 the	 participant	 accepts	 the	bribe	and	cooperates,	and	equals	0	otherwise.	P_nobribe	is	the	price	agreed	before	bribe	or	cooperation	is	offered.	Age	refers	to	the	year	of	birth.	Gender	equals	1	for	male	and	0	for	female.	Educ	is	the	education	level	of	the	participant,	and	equals	1	if	at	 master	 level	 and	 0	 if	 at	 undergraduate	 level.	 Finance	 measures	 the	 financial	condition,	and	it	equals	0	if	described	as	“not	reliable”;	equals	1	if	described	as	“I	am	 not	 sure”;	 and	 equals	 2	 if	 described	 as	 “reliable	 and	 regular”.	 RiskAverse	measures	the	level	of	risk	aversion.	It	simply	takes	the	average	of	seven	likert	scale	questions,	 when	 reversed-scales	 questions	 (question	 1	 to	 5)	 are	 calculated	 as	 5	minus	the	scale.	Open	 is	 the	 level	of	openness	to	change,	which	embraces	human	values	of	stimulation,	self-direction	and	hedonism.	We	first	take	the	average	of	the	scales	 for	 each	 human	 value	 and	 then	 the	 average	 of	 average	 is	 calculated	 as	openness	 to	 change.	 The	 method	 applies	 on	 Consv	 (conservation),	 SeEnha	(self-enhancement)	and	SeTransc	(self-transcendence).	The	author	realizes	that	it	might	be	appropriate	to	use	principle	component	analysis	or	factor	analysis,	when	generating	the	measurements	 for	 these	 four	variables.	However,	 this	approach	 is	based	on	correlations	and	covariance,	while	we	only	obtain	43	observations.	Thus,	average	method	is	deployed	here.	
As	mentioned	above,	the	sales	persons	(i.e.	research	assistants)	will	bargain	based	on	 the	 prices	 given	 by	 a	 programmed	 calculus,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 subjective	variations.	 This	 confirmed	 as	 p-value	 of	 P_nobribe	 is	 0.1285,	 indicating	 that	 the	prices	agreed	before	cooperation	offer	are	 comparable	between	cooperation	and	non-cooperation	 groups.	With	 regard	 to	 control	 variables,	 there	 is	 no	 significant	difference	 between	 two	 groups	 on	 Age,	 Education,	 Financial	 Condition,	 and	 Risk	
Aversion,	 and	 Gender	 seems	 to	 have	 some	 influences	 at	 10	 percent	 significance	level.	 Concerning	 the	 key	 independent	 variables	 of	 the	 thesis,	 the	 means	 of	
Conservation	 and	 Self-Transcendence	 of	 two	 groups	 differ,	 at	 10	 percent	 and	 5	percent	significance	levels	respectively.	On	the	other	hand,	the	values	of	Openness	
to	Change	and	Self-Enhancement	are	not	of	significant	difference	between	groups.	 	
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Nevertheless,	we	need	to	further	check	the	partial	correlation	of	each	variable,	in	order	 to	 decide	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 binary	 dependent	 variable:	 Bribe	
Acceptance.	Table	10	demonstrates	the	logistics	regression	result.	
Comparing	estimation	function	(1)	and	(2)	with	function	(3)	and	(4)	 in	Table	10,	we	 include	the	 fixed	effect	of	research	assistants	 in	 later	 two	 functions.	Since	we	employ	three	assistants,	and	they	conduct	10,	14	and	19	sessions	respectively,	two	dummy	 variables	Assi_1	 and	Assi_2	 are	 used	 to	 represent	 them.	 Overall,	we	 find	that	control	variables	of	Gender,	Financial	Condition	and	Risk	Aversion	do	not	exert	any	 exert	 significant	 influences	 on	 Bribe	 Acceptance.	 It	 contradicts	 to	 most	research	 findings	 as	 discussed	 in	 literature	 review.	 However,	 as	 the	 stakes	 or	compensations	 involved	 are	 quite	 small	 and	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 exposure	 risks	applied,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Financial	 Condition	 and	 Risk	 Aversion	 remains	
(Table	10)	+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                            
pseudo R-sq         0.318           0.312           0.344           0.330   
N                      43              43              43              43   
                                                                            
                  (0.189)         (0.134)         (0.119)         (0.094)   
_cons               372.1           397.7           515.6           517.2+  
                                                  (0.246)         (0.323)   
Assi_2                                              1.684           1.298   
                                                  (0.471)         (0.657)   
Assi_1                                              0.981           0.531   
                  (0.032)         (0.033)         (0.025)         (0.029)   
SelfTransc~e       -2.084*         -1.962*         -2.284*         -2.053*  
                  (0.571)                         (0.411)                   
SelfEnhanc~t       -0.299                          -0.493                   
                  (0.027)         (0.028)         (0.021)         (0.025)   
Conservation        1.804*          1.724*          2.200*          1.954*  
                  (0.937)                         (0.802)                   
OpennessTo~e      -0.0576                          -0.185                   
                  (0.761)         (0.833)         (0.710)         (0.891)   
RiskAverse         -0.242          -0.145          -0.328          -0.106   
                  (0.342)         (0.276)         (0.472)         (0.317)   
Finance             0.503           0.554           0.386           0.506   
                  (0.151)         (0.158)         (0.077)         (0.092)   
Education          -1.527          -1.492          -2.693+         -2.300+  
                  (0.492)         (0.352)         (0.368)         (0.237)   
Gender              0.640           0.821           0.959           1.201   
                  (0.196)         (0.136)         (0.123)         (0.095)   
Age                -0.184          -0.198          -0.256          -0.259+  
Bribe_Accept                                                                
                                                                            
             Bribe_Accept    Bribe_Accept    Bribe_Accept    Bribe_Accept   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)   
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contentious.	Concerning	Age,	its	significance	in	estimation	function	(4)	(Table	10)	is	 relatively	weak	and	unstable.	The	possible	 reasons	might	be	 the	 age	variation	among	our	participants	who	are	 students	 is	 little,	 and	 the	 cohort	 effects	 (i.e.	 the	effects	to	a	person	by	the	social	group	such	as	temporal	experience	or	common	life	experience,	as	opposed	 the	effects	of	age)	cannot	be	 fully	controlled.	 In	addition,	
Education	has	influences	on	Bribe	Acceptance	at	10	percent	significance	level	if	we	include	the	fixed	effect	of	research	assistants.	Despite	weak	statistical	significance,	it	 indicates	 that	 master	 students	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 accept	 bribe	 and	 cooperate	compared	to	undergraduate	students.	However,	further	examination	is	required	as	the	education	backgrounds	of	our	subjects	are	quite	limited,	and	thereby	it	cannot	be	generalized	to	other	education	levels.	 	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 main	 regressors	 of	 the	 thesis,	 Openness	 To	 Change	 and	
Self-Enhancement	 do	 not	 have	 considerable	 effects	 on	 individuals’	 acceptance	 of	bribe.	Thus,	 the	hypothesis	1	 and	hypothesis	3	 are	not	 valid.	On	 the	other	hand,	
Conservation	and	Self-Transcendence	demonstrate	 their	 stable	 significance	on	 the	dependent	 variable.	 For	 example,	 people	 with	 higher	 level	 of	 Conservation	 are	more	likely	to	accept	bribe,	which	is	consistent	with	hypothesis	2.	Hence,	It	can	be	inferred	that	for	a	conservative	individual,	the	propensity	to	rely	on	interpersonal	relationship	 in	 a	 conventional	 society	 stipulates	 stronger	 intention	 than	 the	inclination	to	comply	with	regulation	and	rules.	In	addition,	Self-Transcendence	 is	negatively	 correlated	 to	 Bribe	 Acceptance,	 the	 same	 as	 stated	 in	 hypothesis	 4.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 quite	 interesting	 to	 find	 that	 these	 two	 significant	 motivational	dimensions	 are	 of	 social	 focus,	while	 the	 other	 insignificant	 two	 are	 of	 personal	focus	(see	Figure	3	 in	section	B.4).	So	 it	may	be	 important	 for	 future	research	to	distinguish	 between	 institutional	 influences	 and	 individual	 motivations	 when	considering	ethical	decisions.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
D.2	 	 Stage	2:	How	Bribe	Influences	The	Ultimate	Contract	Price	
After	capturing	the	factors	determining	participants’	decision	on	Bribe	Acceptance,	
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we	 then	 explore	how	bribe	 amount	will	 influence	 contract	 price	 settlement.	 The	analysis	below	is	very	preliminary,	since	we	have	made	several	assumptions	in	the	game,	which	renders	the	situation	differentiated	from	the	business	negotiation	in	reality.	Details	will	be	analysed	in	section	E.	Limitations	and	Reflections.	 	 	
From	Table	11,	 the	dependent	 variable	 of	 estimation	 function	 (1),	 (2)	 and	 (3)	 is	
Price	 Increase,	 which	 is	 calculated	 as	 (Price_bribe-Price_nobribe)/Price_nobribe.	Those	who	reject	bribe,	we	take	Price_bribe	as	equal	to	Price_nobribe.	With	regard	to	Function	(4),	(5)	and	(6)	in	Table	11,	the	dependent	variable	is	PRICE,	which	is	the	ultimate	price	settled	at	 the	end	of	experimental	session.	Since	the	price	 first	agreed	 without	 the	 offer	 of	 bribe	 is	 partly	 based	 on	 certain	 calculus,	 this	 price	should	 not	 be	 of	 significant	 difference	 across	 different	 sessions,	 and	 it	 has	 been	approved	above.	Thus,	 the	estimation	 results	 regarding	Price	 Increase	 and	PRICE	
(Table	11)	+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                            
R-sq                0.934           0.935           0.931           0.790           0.799           0.766   
N                      43              43              43              43              43              43   
                                                                                                            
                  (0.820)         (0.687)         (0.109)         (0.496)         (0.286)         (0.000)   
_cons              -0.304          -0.600          0.0140           186.8           309.3           86.10***
                                  (0.514)                                         (0.194)                   
Assi_2                           -0.00433                                           1.395                   
                                  (0.861)                                         (0.383)                   
Assi_1                           -0.00132                                           1.268                   
                  (0.837)         (0.776)                         (0.918)         (0.893)                   
SelfTransc~e     0.000850         0.00118                          0.0800         -0.0943                   
                  (0.076)         (0.204)         (0.106)         (0.114)         (0.048)         (0.108)   
SelfEnhanc~t     -0.00295+       -0.00285        -0.00368          -0.775          -0.961*         -0.650   
                  (0.789)         (0.908)                         (0.720)         (0.998)                   
Conservation     0.000847        0.000338                          -0.224         0.00124                   
                  (0.869)         (0.979)                         (0.687)         (0.835)                   
OpennessTo~e    -0.000521       0.0000830                           0.379           0.199                   
                  (0.985)         (0.948)                         (0.367)         (0.521)                   
RiskAverse     -0.0000855        0.000269                           0.621           0.467                   
                  (0.309)         (0.307)                         (0.959)         (0.856)                   
Finance           0.00187         0.00216                          0.0231         -0.0894                   
                  (0.562)         (0.439)                         (0.326)         (0.111)                   
Education         0.00326         0.00605                          -1.118          -2.157                   
                  (0.549)         (0.650)                         (0.258)         (0.328)                   
Gender            0.00274         0.00186                          -0.992          -0.813                   
                  (0.820)         (0.688)                         (0.709)         (0.439)                   
Age              0.000153        0.000300                         -0.0511          -0.112                   
                  (0.049)         (0.038)         (0.065)         (0.046)         (0.098)         (0.013)   
BRIBE_2         -0.000366*      -0.000388*      -0.000349+        -0.0577*        -0.0561+        -0.0541*  
                  (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
BRIBE              0.0135***       0.0137***       0.0133***        1.536***        1.502***        1.491***
                                                                                                            
             Price_Incr~e    Price_Incr~e    Price_Incr~e           PRICE           PRICE           PRICE   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
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should	 not	 divide,	which	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 results	we	 have.	 In	 addition,	 the	
BRIBE	 represents	 the	 share	 of	 additional	 compensation	 the	 participant	 requires	from	 the	 research	 assistant.	 If	 the	 session	 ends	 up	 with	 no	 cooperation,	 BRIBE	equals	0.	 	 	
We	 find	that	BRIBE	has	significant	and	stable	 influences	on	contract	price.	 In	 the	perspective	of	the	participant,	the	higher	the	bribe	amount	he	requires,	the	higher	the	price	that	the	participant	will	set.	However,	this	relationship	is	not	linear.	The	squared	 term	 of	 bribe	 (i.e.	 BRIBE_2)	 also	 exerts	 significant	 effects,	 while	 its	coefficient	 is	 negative.	 It	 indicates	 that	 the	 positive	 relationship	 between	 bribe	amount	 and	 price	 augment	 is	 of	 diminishing	 margin.	 After	 reaching	 certain	threshold,	 higher	 bribe	 amount	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 drive	 up	 contract	 price.	 The	procurement	 person	 may	 consider	 the	 negative	 externalities	 exposed	 on	 his	company	(in	this	case,	on	the	experimenter)	and	the	possibility	of	being	exposed	if	the	price	is	settled	unreasonably	high,	even	though	in	theory	these	treatments	are	not	applied.	However,	due	to	the	design	of	the	game	in	this	thesis	and	the	limited	sample	size,	it	does	not	allow	us	to	interpret	the	exact	reasons	behind.	 	
Overall,	with	respect	to	the	relationship	between	bribe	amount	and	contract	price	(stage	 2),	 our	 experiment	 can	 merely	 provide	 a	 very	 preliminary	 finding.	 It	demonstrates	that	the	subjects	will	not	make	the	most	rational	choice	as	in	theory,	but	what	exactly	the	relationship	is	still	requires	further	efforts.	The	next	section	will	then	illustrate	the	limitations	of	this	thesis	and	possible	improvements	in	the	future.	 	
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 Limitations	and	Reflections	E.
Although	in	this	thesis,	the	design	of	business	negotiation	experiment	attempts	to	restore	a	neutrally	 framed	context,	and	thereby	enhances	 the	external	validity	of	conventional	 lab	 experiments	 in	 most	 current	 literatures,	 there	 still	 exist	 some	problems	 regarding	 the	 design	 of	 experiment	 and	 the	 case	 restoration.	 The	following	 section	 will	 point	 out	 these	 limitations	 and	 the	 possible	 solutions	 for	future	research.	 	 	
E.1	 	 The	design	of	Experiment	
In	 order	 to	 retain	 the	 control	 over	 the	 experiment,	 we	 use	 three	 research	assistants,	who	will	 take	 the	role	of	 sales	person	 in	each	negotiation	session	and	serve	as	the	“whistle	blower”	of	the	bribery	activities.	They	will	propose	the	idea	of	cooperation	and	his	willingness	 to	 share	part	of	his	 additional	 compensation	 (as	bribe).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 it	 only	 allows	 us	 to	 explore	 the	 one	 side	 of	 bribery	behaviours,	the	bribe	taking.	In	the	future	the	following	designs	can	be	applied	to	explore	both	bribe	giving	and	bribe	 taking	although	 for	 this	 thesis,	 the	author	 is	not	able	to	collect	enough	samples	due	to	the	time	limitation.	 	
(1) Assign	 research	 assistants	 into	 both	 roles,	 i.e.	 in	 the	 half	 of	 sessions,	 the	research	assistant	will	 take	 the	role	of	procurement	person,	and	 in	 the	other	half,	 he	 will	 take	 the	 role	 of	 sales	 person.	 In	 each	 session,	 the	 asymmetric	compensation	rates	set	will	always	prefer	the	sales	person;	or	 	
(2) Switch	the	asymmetric	compensation	rates,	i.e.	in	the	half	of	sessions,	the	sales	person	has	price	advantage,	and	 in	the	other	half,	 the	procurement	person	is	advantaged.	In	each	session,	the	research	assistant	will	retain	the	role	of	sales	person.	
In	 addition,	 the	occurrence	of	 bribery	 is	not	nature,	 but	 always	proposed	by	 the	research	 assistant.	 The	 underlying	 reason	 of	 this	 instruction	 is	 the	 fixed-pie	
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perception,	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 tendency	 among	 negotiators	 to	 perceive	 own	priorities	and	those	of	the	other	party	as	completely	divergent	(Schelling,	1960).	At	the	 beginning,	 the	 assigned	 missions	 for	 the	 two	 roles	 are	 of	 distributive	competition	 (i.e.	 a	 simple	 compromise-placing	 demands	 or	 making	 concessions	between	 two	 parties),	 while	 accepting	 bribe	 and	 cooperate	 will	 result	 in	integrative	 outcomes	 (i.e.	 both	 of	 the	 parties	 obtain	 satisfied	 results	 through	exchanging	 information	 on	 preferences	 and	 priorities)	 (Lewicki,	 Saunders,	 &	Minton,	 2000).	 However,	 the	 existence	 of	 fixed-pie	 perception	 will	 reduce	 the	possibility	 for	 the	participants	 to	discover	 the	 integrative	opportunity.	Especially	under	 time	 pressure,	 the	 closing	 of	 mind	 tends	 to	 happen,	 which	 then	 leads	 to	freezing	 upon	 fixed-pie	 perception.	 Thus,	 it	 necessary	 to	 revise	 it	 and	 let	 the	research	assistant	propose	the	bribery,	if	the	cooperation	is	expected	to	happen	at	least	 in	 some	 sessions	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 test	 (De	Dreu,	 2003).	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 one	 may	 also	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 role	 of	 asymmetric	compensation	scheme	and	bribery	occurrence	by	applying	following	treatments	to	the	current	framed	context.	 	
(Tr	1) Symmetric	compensation	scheme	
(Tr	2) Asymmetric	compensation	scheme,	sales	person	is	advantaged;	
(Tr	3) Asymmetric	compensation	scheme,	procurement	person	is	advantaged.	
For	all	 three	treatments,	 the	research	assistant	will	 take	the	role	of	sales	person,	but	he	will	not	propose	the	 idea	of	cooperation.	 In	Tr	1,	 there	 is	no	 incentive	 for	either	of	party	to	bribe;	in	Tr2,	sales	person	has	an	incentive	to	bribe;	and	in	Tr3,	procurement	 person	 has	 an	 incentive	 to	 bribe.	 Thus,	 by	 cross-treatment	comparison,	it	is	possible	to	exam	whether	asymmetric	compensation	scheme	will	provoke	bribery	giving	or	bribery	taking	behaviours.	
Besides,	 the	 participant	 is	 required	 to	 give	 the	 initial	 offer	 at	 70G,	 which	 is	 the	
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profit-maximizing	 choice.	 Also,	 this	 instruction	 to	 some	 extent	 increases	 the	comparability	 of	 prices	 between	 different	 experimental	 sessions.	 However,	 if	 he	anticipates	that	his	counterpart	will	definitely	reject	this	offer,	he	will	not	initiate	the	negotiation	at	70G.	Moreover,	in	each	experimental	session,	the	participant	can	decide	the	bribe	amount	 they	want	and	the	appropriate	price	he	wants	 to	set.	 In	reality,	 this	 situation	 can	 almost	 never	 happen.	 Thus,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	relationship	between	these	two	factors	(stage	2)	is	very	preliminary.	It	can	only	be	interpreted	as	how	much	price	the	procurement	person	can	sacrifice	with	regard	to	the	corresponding	bribe	he	desires,	just	from	his	own	perspective.	Thus,	future	games	with	enhanced	delicate	design	are	necessitated.	 	 	 	 	
E.2	 	 Case	Restoration	
Despite	that	this	experiment	tries	to	restore	the	situation	of	business	negotiation,	some	 assumptions	 and	 rules	 are	made	 in	 order	 to	 simplify	 the	 experiment.	 For	example,	 in	 real	 world,	 these	 two	 parties	 will	 meet	 several	 times	 and	 will	 also	conduct	negotiations	with	other	possible	corporate	representatives.	However,	it	is	really	 hard	 to	 restore	 exactly	 this	 real	 situation.	 In	 our	 experiment,	 two	 paired	parties	 will	 only	 meet	 once	 and	 the	 negotiation	 session	 is	 restricted	 within	 10	minutes.	 The	 questions	 that	 whether	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 meetings	 and	interactions	will	change	the	decision	of	bribe	acceptance	still	remain	to	be	solved.	 	 	
In	 addition,	 corruption	 engagement	 is	 usually	 motivated	 by	 chasing	 private	interests	 in	 real	 world,	 while	 in	 this	 experiment,	 their	 decisions	 on	 bribery	acceptance	may	be	influenced	by	two	competing	factors:	suspicion	of	the	research	assistants	 and	 “happiness	 of	 spending”.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 when	 the	 research	assistant	puts	 forward	an	 idea	 that	 is	not	 expected	 in	 the	 scenario	of	 a	business	negotiation	experiment,	it	is	possible	that	the	participant	will	suspect	it	as	part	of	the	 experiment.	 The	 belief	 and	 uncertainty	 concerning	 the	 honesty	 of	 his	counterpart	will	 then	reduce	 the	bribe	acceptance	(Berninghaus	et	al.,	2013).	On	the	 other	 hand,	we	 should	 also	 consider	 the	 positive	 influences	 of	 “happiness	 of	
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spending”	on	bribery	engagement.	As	asserted	by	Dunn,	Aknin,	and	Norton	(2008),	spending	money	on	others	may	generate	more	considerable	emotion	of	happiness	than	spending	on	oneself.	In	our	case,	accepting	bribe	and	cooperating	can	also	be	viewed	as	an	alternative	approach	of	spending	on	others,	since	cooperation	serves	as	 an	 integrative	 game	 and	 both	 of	 them	 can	 earn	 more.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	intention	of	accepting	bribe	is	not	restricted	to	obtaining	more	personal	gains,	but	also	 includes	 the	 propensity	 to	 “assist”	 the	 corresponding	 sales	 person	 to	 earn	more.	Therefore,	when	interpreting	the	estimation	outcomes,	these	two	distorting	factors	should	be	taken	into	consideration.	
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 Conclusions	F.
Over	last	decades,	there	has	been	a	great	amount	of	research,	exploring	the	factors	related	 to	 bribery	 behaviors,	 and	 consequences	 of	 corruptive	 activities.	 In	 this	thesis,	 we	 attempt	 to	 improve	 the	 design	 of	 conventional	 lab	 experiment,	 and	restore	a	corruptible	situation	of	business	negotiation	in	an	analogous	framed	field	experiment.	 Based	 on	 the	 asymmetric	 compensation	 scheme	 between	 the	 sales	person	 (i.e.	 the	 research	 assistant)	 and	 the	 paired	 procurement	 person	 (i.e.	 the	participant),	 the	 research	 assistant	 will	 propose	 the	 COOPERATION	 idea,	 and	thereby	 the	 participant	 will	 make	 this	 ethical	 decision	 while	 unaware	 of	 taking	part	of	a	bribe-related	experiment.	Specifically,	if	they	agree	to	take	the	bribe	and	cooperate,	 the	 author	 has	 to	 pay	 higher	 compensation	 to	 her	 participants	while	obtaining	inaccurate	data	in	their	perspective.	In	that	situation,	the	author	serves	as	 the	 company	 who	 will	 suffer	 losses	 when	 representatives	 of	 the	 negotiation	conspire	for	their	own	private	gains.	 	
In	total,	we	hold	43	experimental	sessions	with	students	as	subjects.	We	find	that	individuals	with	higher	Conservation	value	and	lower	Self-Transcendence	value	are	more	 likely	 to	 accept	 bribe,	 while	 values	 of	 Openness	 To	 Change	 and	
Self-Enhancement	 do	 not	 exert	 any	 significant	 influences.	 It	 may	 provide	 some	suggestions	 for	 companies.	 For	 example,	 personal	 values	 and	 beliefs	 can	 be	 a	factor	 related	 to	 unethical	 decisions,	 which	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	recruiting	 human	 resources	 from	undergraduate	 and	master	 students	 and	when	devising	 possible	 solutions	 to	 enhance	 business	 ethicality.	 In	 addition,	 in	 the	perspective	 of	 the	 participants,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 contract	 price	 that	they	 can	 sacrifice	 for	 the	bribe	 that	 they	desire	 is	 positive,	 but	with	diminishing	margin.	Nevertheless,	this	result	is	still	in	very	preliminary	phase	and	suffers	some	limitations.	For	example,	it	only	explores	bribe-taking	side	and	some	experimental	settings	do	not	reproduce	the	real	situation	of	business	negotiation.	Therefore,	 it	necessitates	future	efforts	to	further	augment	the	experimental	design.	
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Participant	Script	
	
	
Dear	Participant,	  Once	you	 receive	 this	 paper,	 you	are	 involved	 in	 a	business	price	negotiation	simulation.	 In	this	experiment,	you	play	as	a	procurement	person	on	behalf	of	your	company.	The	general	information	is	as	follow:	  This	year,	your	corporation	plans	to	buy	some	semi-finished	product	 from	the	sales	 company.	 So,	 you	 are	 asked	 to	 negotiate	with	 the	 representative	 of	 the	sales	company	on	the	contract	price.	You	know	that	the	costs	of	producing	this	semi-finished	 product	 are	 around	 70	 Gilbert	 in	 market	 (Gilbert	 is	 a	 virtual	currency).	 It	 means	 the	 sales	 person	 from	 the	 other	 company	 would	 never	make	 the	 consensus	 at	 lower	 than	 G70.	 Thus,	 to	 make	 it	 simple,	 you	 are	required	 to	 start	 the	 negotiation	at	 a	 price	G70.	 In	addition,	 the	manager	has	told	you	 that	 our	 company	cannot	 sell	 the	 final	product	 (which	 is	made	 from	this	semi-finished	product)	higher	than	G100,	at	which	the	firm	almost	makes	no	profits.	Furthermore,	this	semi-product	is	provided	only	by	a	few	companies.	Thus,	it	is	very	important	for	you	to	make	this	contract. Your	objective	is	to	set	the	price	as	low	as	possible	to	help	company’s	earnings.	Besides,	your	compensation	for	participating	in	this	simulation	will	depend	on	contract	price	you	settle	with	the	sales	person.	Specifically,	if	you	get	1G	lower	from	G100,	you	will	be	remunerated	0.2	Euro.)	  You	 must	 finish	 the	 negotiation	 within	 the	 10	 minutes.	 Otherwise,	 the	negotiation	fails	and	you	will	only	get	the	show-up	fee	of	1	euro. If	there	is	any	confusing	part,	don't	hesitate	to	ask	the	instructor	now.	 	After	 the	 simulation,	 you	 need	 to	 fill	 in	 a	 questionnaire,	 but	 no	 personal	identifications	are	needed.	Thanks	for	your	time	and	cooperation,	and	have	a	nice	experience.	  	
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Research	Assistant	Script	
In	each	business	negotiation	session,	you	are	required	to	follow	the	instructions	below:	 	
1. At	the	beginning	of	the	experiment,	introduce	your	name,	nationality.	
2. Offer	your	prices	in	according	to	the	programmed	calculus.	
3. Try	to	settle	the	first	agreed	price	in	the	first	5	to	7	minutes.	4. After	first	price	settlement,	you	start	to	introduce	COOPERATION	proposal:	
• After	 achieving	 price	 agreement,	 you	 can	 say:	 “Ok,	 now	 as	 we	 have	achieved	our	agreement,	 I	think	the	experiment	has	 finished.	Can	I	ask	what’s	 your	 compensation	 rate	 that	we	 drew	 from	 the	box?	Mine	 is	 2	Euro	per	Gilbert.”	 	
• After	the	participant	tells	his	rate,	you	can	say:	“oh,	compared	with	you,	I	am	quite	lucky.	So,	with	this	price	we	agreed,	I	can	earn	((price-70)*2)	euro,	and	you	can	have	((100-price)*2)	euro,	right?”	
• Then,	you	provide	COOPERATION	option	by	saying:	“Hey,	 I	 just	realize	that	maybe	we	can	cooperate	and	raise	the	price	higher.	Since	my	rate	is	much	higher	than	yours,	I	can	earn	much	more	money	and	you	will	just	lose	little.	And	I	can	share	with	you.	Both	of	us	can	earn	more!	Why	not?	I	mean,	at	the	end	we	just	need	to	tell	her	(the	experimenter)	a	price.	It	does	not	matter	if	we	change	the	price,	she	doesn’t	have	to	know,	right?”	
5. Afterwards,	you	let	the	participant	to	decide	whether	to	COOPERATE.	If	he	accepts,	you	can	say:	“Great,	so	what	price	do	you	think	we	can	make,	and	how	much	 you	want	 to	 share?	As	 I	 have	 already	made	 some	money,	 I	 am	fine	with	any	suggestions	and	you	can	decide.”	
6. After	the	participant	tells	the	shares	he	wants	and	the	price	he	think	you	can	raise	to,	you	can	show	the	calculations	of	 the	 final	payoffs	of	you	two,	and	compared	them	with	the	payoffs	before.	This	process	 is	 to	ensure	 that	 the	participant	have	got	the	meaning	of	COOPERATION.	
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Codes	for	Java	Eclipse	
	 	
import	java.io.FileWriter;	 	import	java.io.IOException;	 	import	java.util.Scanner;	public	class	Negotiation_nobribe	{	public	static	void	main(String[]	arg)	throws	Exception{	FileWriter	out=new	FileWriter("/Users/apple/Desktop/Experiment	Data.docx",true);	float	Procureprice0=0,Procureprice1=0;	 	double	Salesprice=0;	Scanner	in=new	Scanner(System.in);	 	do{	System.out.println("Please	inp70ut	Procurement	person's	price");	 	Procureprice1=in.nextFloat();	out.write("Procure	price:("+Procureprice1+",)");	 	out.write("\r\n");	 	Salesprice=ProcureIn(Salesprice,Procureprice0,Procureprice1);	 	System.out.println("Sales	person's	price	is	"+Salesprice);	 	out.write("Sales	price:"+Salesprice);	out.write("\r\n");	Procureprice0=Procureprice1;	 	out.flush();	}while(Salesprice>=Procureprice1);	out.close();	}	public	static	double	ProcureIn(double	Salesprice,float	Procureprice0,float		 	 Procureprice1){	float	x;		 	 double	SalesP	=	0;		 	 int	i;		 	 if	(Procureprice0==0&&Procureprice1==70)		 	 {	SalesP=100;}	else	{		 	 x=(Procureprice1-Procureprice0)/Procureprice0*100;	i=(int)(Math.random()*100);		 	 if	(i>=0&&i<=29){	SalesP=Salesprice*(1-0.8*x/100);		 	 }		 	 else	if(i>=30&&i<=69){		 	 SalesP=Salesprice*(1-x/100);	}		 	 else	{	SalesP=Salesprice*(1-1.2*x/100);}		 	 }		 	 return	SalesP;		 	 }	}	 	 		
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